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INTRODUCTION
The twin theses of this Article are that the English land law was transformed
in the three quarters of a century running roughly from 1625 to 1700, and that
it was the English Revolution which also dominated these seventy-five years
that was responsible for this transformation. The theses of this Article run
counter to the accepted historiography of English law. This
historiography-classically represented by such giants as T.F.T. Plucknett and
Sir William Holdsworth and found more recently in the scholarship of such
eminent historians as S.F.C. Milsom-views the history of English law as the
incremental building up of structures first established in the days of Henry II
or Edward 1.2 This historiography has a long pedigree. Indeed, as Harold
Berman has established, it was a part of the ideology of the English Revolution
itself that the history of the English common law consists of the gradual
elaboration of premises laid down at a very early date.3
But while legal historians celebrate the seamless continuity of the English
legal system, historians investigating other questions about
seventeenth-century England have come to the conclusion that this was a
decisive time in the history of that nation and its relationship to the larger
world. It was in the seventeenth century that England established itself as a
global economic power, with colonies and interests extending from the
Caribbean, to the Atlantic seaboard of North America, to the coasts of Africa,
and to the Indian subcontinent. In the fifteenth century, England had occupied
a peripheral place on the edge of the European continent. In the seventeenth
century, the same location that had previously kept England isolated now
acquired strategic significance as England expanded its reach to global
dimensions.
What is sometimes overlooked by the historians documenting this
transformation is the revolution that occurred in its midst. But it must be borne
in mind that the seventeenth century in England was not only a period of global
2 See T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 75-76 (5th ed., 1956) (tracing
the "gradual formation" of the English state and law from the Anglo-Saxon kings to
Edmund Burke's "appeal to history, to experience, and to the traditional English habit
of compromise and cautious reform .... in the wake of the disruptions of the French
Revolution); I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 2 (7th ed., rev., 1956)
(referring to the"gradual evolution" of the English law). Similarly, Milsom, in discussing
the history of the English land law refers to its development as occurring "step by
forward step."S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONSOFTHE COMMON LAW 168 (1969).
3 See generally Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden,
Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994). The peculiarly English belief that the development of the
common law consists of a gradual and faithful evolution from first premises is on vivid
display in Berman's treatment of Sir Edward Coke's historicism. See id. at 1681-1694 and
Sir Matthew Hale's response to Thomas Hobbes's attack on the common law. Id. at
1714-18. Very often, biological metaphors were made use of to describe the nature of
this gradual growth. See, for instance, Berman's treatment of Thomas Hedley's speech
to Parliament in 1610. Id. at 1686, n.93 ("The common law, being the 'work of time,' is
accommodated to the kingdom as 'the skin to the hand, which groweth with it"').
1995]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
expansion, but also a time of revolutionary upheaval. The first foreshadowings
of these upheavals can be detected in the increasingly frosty relations between
James I and Parliament, and can be traced through Charles I's attempt to rule
without Parliament-his "personal rule"-the ensuing Civil War and
Commonwealth period, the Restoration of the Stuarts to the throne in the
person of Charles II, the Glorious Revolution of 1688/89 that resulted in the
deposition of James II and the arrival of William and Mary from the Continent,
and the enduring settlement that was finally worked out between Crown and
Parliament in the 1690s.
This Revolution, furthermore, was not simply a random occurrence, some
transitory illness in an otherwise healthy body politic. Rather, the events that
constitute the English Revolution represent a "great revolution" in the sense
described by Harold Berman.4 It was a total upheaval of the society that
resulted by the year 1700 in the creation of a new ensemble of institutions and
beliefs.
It should not be surprising that these upheavals had an impact on the law.
Indeed, it has already been established that the English Revolution imparted
to the West a new jurisprudence-historical jurisprudence-that is distinctly
different from both natural law and positivism. The historical jurisprude takes
as normative not transcendent principles of moral reasoning good for all times
4 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 18-33 (1983) (setting out a general theory of revolution and the
relationship of revolution to law). Berman sees the outbreak of each of the great
revolutions as caused, in part, by the failure of the old system of law. See id. at 20. One
component, then, of the successful revolution is the replacement of the old system with
a new system and the ultimate harmonization of old and new. See id. at 20-23. See also
Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. L. REV. 569, 590-13 (1984)
(applying his theoryof revolution and law to the English Revolution). Cf CharlesJ. Reid,
Jr., The Papacy, Theology, and Revolution: A Response to Joseph L. Soria's Critique of Harold
J. Berman's Law and Revolution, 29 STUDIA CANONICA 433,473-80 (1995) (further analyzing
Berman's theory of revolution).
Nor is Berman alone in considering the English Revolution to be one of the great
revolutions of the West. Crane Brinton similarly considers the English Revolution as
one of "the great overturns in previously stable political societies in the past .... See
CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION 2 (rev. ed., 1952). Christopher Hill
considers the Revolution "an event of European significance" which had significant
"intemational repercussions."See CHRISTOPHER HILL, PURITANISM ANDREVOLUTION: THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 123-24 (1958). Eugen
Rosenstock-Huessy declares that the English Revolution "was a human, a Christian, a
universal event." See EUGEN ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY, OUT OF REVOLUTION: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN MAN (Argo Books 1969) (1938). This assessment of the
English Revolution has deep roots. The nineteenth-century historian Leopold von
Ranke held a similar view. Von Ranke described the English Revolution as possessing
"universal importance" and added: "[It is an event that concerns all, this shaking of the
foundations of the old British state." II LEOPOLD VON RANKE, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND
PRINCIPALLY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 331, quoted in PEREZ ZAGORIN, THE COURT
AND THE COUNTRY: THE BEGINNING OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 5(1969).
This Article builds on Berman's theory of the relationship of law and revolution
and applies it in the specific context of the transformation of the English land law.
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and places, nor the pronouncements of a duly constituted political authority,
but the lived experiences of the people.5
But legal philosophy was not all that was transformed. The English land law
was also remade, "modernized," by this revolutionary upheaval. This point was
made well by Percy Bordwell: Sir Edward Coke, the early seventeenth-century
common lawyer, Bordwell observed, "stood between the old system of land
law and the new while Lord Mansfield [1704-1793] was the embodiment of the
new.'
6
It is the purpose of this Article to explore systematically the creation of the
new system of land law in the seventeenth century. The Article opens with a
brief introduction to some of the major events of the seventeenth century to
assist readers unfamiliar with this period. Successive sections will then treat
the abolition of the feudal tenures and the adoption of socage tenure, the defeat
of copyhold and the triumph of the enclosure movement, the creation of the
rule against perpetuities and the strict settlement, and the creation of the
modem trust and mortgage instruments.
I. THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
A. A Schematic Chronology of the Revolution
In 1603, James VI of Scotland succeeded to the throne of his distant relative,
Queen Elizabeth I, and took the title of James I of England. In the best of
circumstances, James would have found the governance of England difficult.
But James proved to possess both a prickly personality and a political
maladroitness that consistently put him at odds with leading figures in the
realm. 7 The situation was further exacerbated by James's pointed advocacy of
5See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 1731-38 (exploring the growth and development of
historical jurisprudence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Harold J. Berman,
Toward an Integrated Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 788-97
(further analyzing historical jurisprudence and its nineteenth-century development in
Germany).
6 See Percy Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin, Part 134 HARV. L. REV. 592,621 (1920-1921).
Elsewhere in the same article, Bordwell speaks of a "revolution in land law" occurring
in the seventeenth century, although he makes little of this insight. Id. at 601. George
Haskins, in an important article on the origin of the rule against perpetuities, has also
recognized the importance of the revolutionary conditions of the seventeenth century
but, like Bordwell, draws no larger conclusions about the transformation of the English
land law. See George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the
Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977) [hereinafter Extending
the Grasp]. Cf., George L. Haskins, "'Inconvenience"' and the Rule For Perpetuities, 48 Mo.
L. REV. 451 (1983) (further elaborating the arguments found in "Extending the Grasp of
the Dead Hand").
7For examples of both James's personal irritability and his political clumsiness, see
WILLIAM MCELWEE, THE WISEST FOOL IN CHRISTENDOM: THE REIGN OF KING JAMES I AND
VI 90-126, 145-62 (1958).
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a theory of royal absolutism that was entirely shorn of the soft edges and careful
qualifications found in Tudor political thought.8
James reigned from 1603 to 1625. His relations with his own judiciary
steadily deteriorated over these two decades. This deterioration can perhaps
best exemplified by his relationship with Sir Edward Coke. In a series of
decisions in the 1600s and 1610s, Coke came to assert the primacy of the
common-law courts over courts such as Star Chamber or High Commission,
thatwere an outgrowth of the royal prerogative.9 A more gifted politician might
have been able to sidestep a confrontation with the assertive Coke, but James
was entirely lacking in such talents. James and Coke confronted one another
directly over the relationship of the royal power to the common law in the Case
of Commendams (1616) and while Coke was removed from his position as Chief
Justice of King's Bench as a result his perceived challenge to royal authority,
the monarchy was ultimately weakened by this conflict as well.10
James's relations with Parliament also grew steadily worse. Again, one
might take a single episode as representative of conditions late in James's reign.
In 1621, James summoned Parliament to meet as conflict with Spain loomed.
James requested an appropriation of £500,000 be approved, in order to prepare
for war. Parliament voted only £160,000, which James promptly spent.
Thereupon, the King requested the balance be approved without explaining
how he had made use of the £160,000. Parliament took exception at the refusal
to offer an explanation, and not only did not approve further expenditures; it
challenged James's conduct of relations with Spain and prepared a "Great
Protestation," meant as a statement of "the ancient and undoubted birthright
and inheritance of the subjects of England."11 James responded by tearing the
Protestation from the House Journal and dissolving Parliament.12
James was succeeded as king in 1625 by his son Charles, who ruled as Charles
I. Charles would have even more difficulty with Parliament than his father.
Charles convoked four parliaments between 1625 and 1629, with each session
growing stormier. The Parliament that met in 1628 approved the Petition of
Right, which, as its title suggests, sought from Charles a number of concessions
that were asserted to belong to the English people as of right. Among its
requests-made in strong language and supported by recitations of legal
8See THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I (Charles H. McIlwain, ed. 1918). Cf. Berman,
supra note 3, at 1667-1672 (analyzing James's theory of royal absolutism) and at 1673
(analyzing the impact of James's crudely expressed absolutism on Parliament).
9These cases are analyzed in detail in Berman, supra note 3, at 1682-86.
10See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552-1634) 342-390 (1956) (detailing Coke's tenure as Chief Justice
and his encounter with King James). The Case of Commendarns involved a challenge to
the royal power to grant ecclesiastical benefices. The facts can be found at id. 370-74.
11GOLDWIN SMITH, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 299 (2d ed. rev. 1957).
121d. For a review of James's relations with Parliament in the earlier years of his reign,
see SMITH, supra note 11, at 290-94.
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precedent-the Petition sought the abolition of arbitrary taxation and royal
agreement that taxes ought only to be levied with "common consent by act of
Parliament," the cessation of arbitrary arrests, and an end to the practice of
quartering of troops in citizens' homes.13 Charles "reluctantly agreed" to
Parliament's demands. 14
The Parliament of 1629 proved even more intractable from Charles's
perspective. Again, a king found himself challenged in his foreign policy.
Charles had gone to war with France and Spain, but Parliament refused to vote
the funds necessary to prosecute the campaigns successfully. As a result,
Charles first made peace with his foreign adversaries and then dissolved
Parliament in 1629, attempting to rule the country for the next eleven years
without convening another assembly.15
Charles's "personal rule" proved to be a disaster both for the nation and for
Charles personally. Charles surrounded himself with figures-such as
Archbishop William Laud-who were widely unpopular, and he proceeded to
try to avoid the requirement that Parliament approve new requests for taxes
by extracting as much revenue as possible from those sources traditionally
available to the monarch.16
By 1640, however, Charles's circumstances had grown desperate. Three
years earlier, Scotland had rebelled against Charles's religious policies and
raised an army with the intention of going to war with England. Charles
responded first by borrowing money and then by seizing the assets of the
wealthiest business in England, the East India Company, but when these
expedients failed he found that he had no other course but to reconvene
Parliament.17
And so in 1640 what later became known as the Long Parliament was
convened. Parliament immediately commenced to assert its rights against the
King and prepared a set of grievances known as the Grand Remonstrance,
which was issued in November, 1641. Parliament also began to take action
against the king's closest ministers, causing the Earl of Strafford to be executed
and Archbishop Laud to be arrested. In the midst of this constitutional struggle,
the Irish rebelled. Parliament feared that if the militia were called up to meet
the Irish threat it might used to crush parliamentary independence and so
enacted in early 1642 a Militia Bill placing command of the armed forces under
parliamentary control. Charles rejected the Bill, but Parliament responded by
131d. at 309-10 (discussing in greater detail these and other provisions of the Petition
of Right).
141d. at 310.
15 d. at 311-13.
161d. at 313-16. See also KEVIN SHARPE, THE PERSONAL RULE OF CHARLES 1105-30 (1992).
Some of these sources included the feudal incidents and the fines extracted from the
operation of the commissions on depopulation and enclosures. These sources, and their
abolition, are discussed infra at notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
17 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 319-21.
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making it an ordinance of the realm. Charles "ordered the people by
proclamation to disobey the ordinance of Parliament" but "both houses of
Parliament declared that their ordinance must be obeyed."18
Parliament also asserted ever more vigorously an even broader array of
rights against the Crown. A set of Nineteen Propositions, which aimed at
restricting the royal prerogative in a variety of ways, were enacted and
forwarded to Charles. Acceptance of these propositions "would have left
[Charles] a puppet king," and this was not a result Charles desired.19 Charles
would go to war rather than sacrifice those parts of the royal prerogative
demanded by the Nineteen Propositions. Civil war broke out in August, 1642.20
The war bore inconclusive results at first. Things began to turn badly for
Charles beginning in 1645, with the organizing by Parliament of the "New
Model Army" under the command of Oliver Cromwell. The purpose of the
Army was to provide "a more speedy, vigorous, and effectual prosecution of
the war," and it succeeded in this task, defeating Charles's forces in several
important engagements.21 Charles surrendered to the Scots in 1646, hoping
that he might thereby set the Scots off against the parliamentary army, but his
hopes would prove illusory and he soon found himself kidnapped by the
parliamentarians in the summer of 1647. He escaped that November, but was
quickly taken prisoner once again. Parliament decided to place Charles on trial
for treason against the realm. Charles refused to answer the charges directly
and defended himself by arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction. In the event,
Charles was found guilty and executed in January, 1649.22
The beheading of Charles only shifted the venue of the struggle for power
in England. Oliver Cromwell, who had emerged as one of the strongest of the
revolutionary leaders, forcibly disbanded the Long Parliament in 1653,
marching several hundred musketeers into the House of Commons and
18Id. at 320-24 (summarizing the struggle of 1641-1642); at 324 (quoting Charles's call
to disobey the parliamentary ordinance and the parliamentary response).
191d. at 325. Smith states:
Under the terms of the Nineteen Propositions, the privy councillors,
the principal officers and judges of the state, the tutors of the king's
children, all were to be appointed only with the approval of Parlia-
ment. The king was asked to put all forts and castles under Parlia-
ment's control; to dismiss his military forces; to take away the votes
of all Catholic peers; to promise that his children would not conclude
any marriage not approved by Parliament; to enforce the laws against
Jesuits, priests, and Popish recusants. Such were the major demands
of the Nineteen Propositions.
Id.
20Id. at 325. Cf. ROBERT ASHTON, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: CONSERVATISM AND
REVOLUTION, 1603-1649 at 157-319 (2d ed. 1989) (documenting in great detail the events
of the Civil War).
21See SMITH, supra note 11, at 331.
221d. at 337-39.
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declaring "I will put an end to your prating."23 Cromwell thereafter governed
as Lord Protector until his death in 1658, while various experiments in devising
a workable Parliament and constitution foundered. In 1659, negotiations were
begun with Charles's son. These negotiations led to the restoration of the
monarchy in May, 1660.24
The Restoration-by which the reign of Charles 11 (1660-1685) is customarily
known-was a period of enormous outward expansion and economic growth.
England's interests in North America and India were steadily expanding. At
home, London took on the trappings of a center of world commerce, with an
opulent court and the construction of monumental architecture, courtesy of
Christopher Wren.25
But the Restoration was not a turning back of the clock to a time before the
Civil War.26 The monarchy, as James I and as Charles I had understood it was
dead and would not be revived. Rather, the Restoration represented the
fulfillment of parliamentary ambitions. Charles II had been summoned back
to England in 1660 by the Long Parliament-which had reconstituted itself
after Cromwell's death-and neither this Parliament nor its successors were
desirous of relinquishing their new authority. The prerogative courts, for
instance, which had been abolished in the 1640s in the full flush of
parliamentary success, were not about to be restored.27
Charles II died in 1685, and was succeeded by James II. While Charles had
been covertly sympathetic with the Catholic cause, James was openly
pro-Catholic, and his religious inclinations soon landed him in trouble. By the
1680s, the English elites had for the most part turned Protestant and-since
much about their status depended upon religious affiliation-they were not
about to countenance a threat to their position. Once again, opposition to a king
mounted in Parliament. James was deposed in 1688, and William and Mary
were invited by leading members of Parliament to take possession of the vacant
throne. Eventually deciding that resistance was futile, James left the country.28
1689, then, represents the definitive establishment of the parliamentary
monarchy. A Declaration of Rights was enacted into law in 1689, and
Parliament turned its attention to the enactment of a whole panoply of
231d. at 345.
241d. at 347-50.
251d. at 349-62. See generally RONALD HUTrON, THE RESTORATION: A POLITICAL AND
RELIGIOUS HISTORYOF ENGLANDAND WALES, 1658-1667 (1985); JOHN MILLER, CHARLES II
(1991).
26 See Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, supra note 4, at 598 ("there was no
going back... ").
27As one historian has put it: "Parliament did not restore the monarchy of Charles
, but retained those subsequent reforms which benefited its members as a class, an
estate, or an institution." HUTTON, supra note 25, at 155. On the abolition of the
prerogative courts, see infra notes 84 and 91 and accompanying text.
28 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 363-68.
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legislation intended to reform vast areas of law.29 The revolutionary fevers
were abating and a new order was being born.
B. The Gentry and Revolution
There were many causes of the English Revolution and to reduce this
question to the claim that it was the revolution of the landed gentry would be
simplistic. 30 But so long as one avoids reductionism, it is nevertheless possible
to assert that the gentry were among the chief participants in the Revolution
and among its chief beneficiaries.
To understand the position the gentry occupied in English society in the
seventeenth century, one might begin with the situation two hundred years
earlier, in the fifteenth century. An old and prestigious nobility occupied the
very top of the English social hierarchy. It was once taken as a commonplace
that in the fifteenth century this "ancient, fractious nobility to a great extent
destroyed itself during the Wars of the Roses, and that the early Tudors
completed the repression of its remnants and governed through bureaucrats
of middle class origin."31 But even if this stereotype has now fallen into
disrepute, one might nevertheless safely state that the leading families of
England engaged in a relentless competition for power throughout the fifteenth
century, which sometimes resulted in bloody rounds of fratricidal slaughter.
32
And while it would be an overly facile generalization to state that the Tudor
monarchs "completed the repression" of the "remnants" of this group, it is
nevertheless the case that the Tudor monarchs, beginning with Henry VII,
appealed to the "middle sorts" at the expense of the nobility.
33
Occupying second place, then, in fifteenth-century society were the gentry,
"who formed the largest group of the kingdom's landowners in terms of
29 0n the English Declaration of Rights, see Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS (1981); for an example of the new outburst of parliamentary legislation in the
area of the reform of criminal procedure, see Samuel Rezneck, The Statute of 1696: A
Pioneer Measure in the Reform of Judicial Procedure in England, 2 J. MOD. HIST. 5 (1930).
30Some of these various causes are reviewed in LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OFTHE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1529-1642 (1972).
3 1J.R. LANDER, CROWN AND NOBILITY, 1450-1509 13 (1976).
32 Two recent and helpful accounts of this recurrent warfare are ALISON WEIR,
LANCASTER AND YORK: THE WARS OFTHE ROSES (1995) and ROBIN NEILLANDS, THE WARS
OF THE ROSES (1992).
33 Thus Geoffrey Elton states concerning Henry VII and the nature of his appeal to
the English public:
Fundamental to [Henry VII's] dynasty was, as is commonly recognised,
the support of his people, a support which the Tudors rarely endangered
and never lost. Most Englishmen had little interest in noble faction and
those who suffered from the disturbed times only wanted a king who
would restore order, no matter if his rose were white or red ....
GEOFFREY ELTON, ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS 42 (3d ed. 1991).
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numbers."34 As is perhaps to be expected, the gentry of fifteenth-century
England was a diverse group, with substantial differences existing between the
resources and expectations of the "upper" and the "lesser" gentry.35 Even in the
fifteenth century, the gentry came to be defined by their relationship to the land.
The possession of a substantial estate conferred on the fifteenth-century
gentleman status, power, and privilege. More than an economic resource, land
was a political resource, which-when held in substantial amounts-conferred
on its possessor authority within society.36
The question of the relative status of the gentry in the sixteenth century has
been one of the more keenly debated historiographic questions of the last half
century. Was the gentry "rising" or "falling?"37 There is no need, for our
purposes, to resolve this question. Rather, it suffices to note that the gentry was
restless. Monarchies throughout Europe were consolidating power and
making novel and broad claims to power. James I's doctrine of royal absolutism
was derived from and had counterparts in continental developments. 38
These claims threatened the wealth and status of landed elites throughout
Europe, and England was no exception. Indeed, there were uprisings
throughout Europe in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, from
Catalonia and Portugal in the West, to that part of the Ukraine subject to the
Polish king in the East. One common denominator in all of these uprisings was
34J.M.W. Bean, Landlords, in 1H THE AGRARIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 526
(Edward Miller, ed., 1991).
35 See C.E. Moreton, A Social Gulf? The Upper and Lesser Gentry of Later Medieval
England, 17 J. MEDIEVAL HIST. 255 (1991) (exploring the social differences that existed
within fifteenth-century gentry society); Mary L. Robertson, 'Sires remembre we are
neyghbours:' English Gentry Communities in the Fifteenth Century, 34 J. BRIT. STUD. 112
(1995) (reviewing recent scholarship on the fifteenth-century gentry).
3 6See Kate Mertes, Aristocracy, in FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ATTITUDES: PERCEPTIONS OF
SOCIETY IN MATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (Rosemary Horrox, ed., 1994). Mertes states:
Landholders, once the gods of the little land they ruled, still retained
political authority over their manors. They had a limited but impor-
tant judicial role in manorial courts, deciding many cases of petty
personal and property crime; and it was their status as landholders
that got them appointed to commissions of the peace that played
such a large role in county affairs, and sometimes brough them to
parliament.
Id. at 49.
37R.H. Tawney was probably responsible for generating this debate with the essay
entitled The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640, 11 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1941). Tawney's
perception of thegentryasa rising landed class that imposed "modem" economic values
on a broken feudal order was challenged by H.R. Trevor-Roper in The Gentry, 1540-1640,
ECON. HIST. REV. (1953) (Supp. I). The debate was gradually refined. See STONE, supra
note 30; J.H. Hexter, Storm Over the Gentry, in J.H. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 117
(1962); J.H. Hexter, The English Aristocracy, Its Crises, and the English Revolution,
1558-1640, 8J. BRIT. STUD. 22 (1968).
38 For an example of the sort of royalist theorizing found on the Continent, see JEAN
BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin, ed. and trans., 1992).
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resistance on the part of threatened landed classes to a centralizing monarchical
power that advanced ever more comprehensive powers to tax or otherwise
claim the property of its subjects. 39
The English Revolution differed from these other uprisings in the degree of
success that the revolutionaries enjoyed. Charles I was overthrown and
executed at least in substantial part because of the threat he posed to the
property of his subjects. That class with the most to lose-the gentry-then set
about constructing a system of property law that would accomplish two
essential aims: It would be secure from irrational seizure by the Crown; and it
would promote the gentry's essential interests. It would prove to be a durable
system. Large parts of the system erected by the gentry remain in effect even
today both in Great Britain and in the United States.
II. THE ABOLITION OF THE FEUDAL INCIDENTS AND THE TRIUMPH
OF SOCAGE TENURE
One of Charles I's principal sources of revenue during his personal rule was
derived from his exploitation of the feudal incidents, particularly
knight-service and wardship. These incidents were obligations that attached
to the holding of land and dated back to a time in English history when all land
was held on the basis of the martial prowess of the landholder. They had been
revived by the early Tudor monarchs in a desperate search for new sources of
revenue. The gentry, however, saw these practices as threats to their status and
their economic well-being, and as fundamentally irrational since they were
unconnected to any real economic activity.
This Section details the struggle between those who profited by the feudal
incidents-chiefly supporters of the monarchy-and those who advocated
their abolition-chiefly members of the parliamentary party. Free and common
socage tenure was particularly favored by the gentry as a substitute for the
3 9 Perez Zagorin states:
Amidst these differences and the prevalence of particular causes,
one broad feature nevertheless characterized in some degree the
context of nearly all the mid-century rebellions. Most of them were
directed against a monarchical power which, however vulnerable
at the moment of revolt because of war or other difficulties, had
grown during the preceding decades more centralized, more capable
of imposing its will, more uniform in controlling and disciplining all
ranks of its subjects.... The inherited and prescriptive privileges of
assemblies of estates, the liberties of provinces and of degrees of men,
were pared down, became thin and emaciated, or were rendered life-
less at the feet of the all-conquering Leviathan.... To finance govern-
ment, war, and courts, the princes challenged or obtained a taxing
power that invaded their subjects' security of property. It was in-
evitable that so far-reaching an application of royal power among
peoples not yet fully habituated to bear the yoke should give rise
to popular and aristocratic reaction.
ZAGORIN, supra note 4, at 4-5. I owe this reference and this general line of argument to
Harold Berman.
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feudal incidents, since it did not carry with it the obligation to perform services
or pay fees to the Crown, and could therefore be easily acquired, put to use, or
alienated. 40 With the triumph of Parliament in the mid-seventeenth century,
socage tenure would prevail and remains today the principal land tenure in
England.4 1
40 The "free and common" language must be stressed. Socage tenure is described by
Simpson as being historically "the great residual category of tenure .... " A.W.B.
SIMPSON, A HISTORYOFTHE LAND LAw 11 (2d ed., 1961). Socage tenure during the twelfth
through sixteenth centuries might have attached to it a variety of services and
obligations. By the seventeenth century, however, a type of socage tenure had developed
which was "free and common," which is "only another way of saying that it is just held
... free (of services) and common (in the sense of immune from special customary
incidents) .... Id. at 13. Littleton's definition of socage tenure is found at infra note 60.
The story of the triumph of free and common socage tenure forms Part II A-C of this
Article.
41 1d. at 199. One also finds occasional references to socage tenure in American law.
Thus one finds in the New Jersey Statutes:
The tenures of honors, manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
or of estates of inheritance at the common law, held either of the
King of England, or of any other person or body politic or corporate,
at any time before July fourth, one thousand seven hundred and
seventy-six, and declared, by section three of an act entitled 'An
Act Concerning Tenures,' passed February eighteenth, one thou-
sand seven hundred and ninety-five, to be turned into holdings
by free and common socage from the time of their creation and fore-
ver thereafter, shall continue to be held in free and common socage,
discharged of all the tenures, charges, and incidents enumerated...
N.J. REV. STAT. § 46.3-2 (1994). The New Jersey Statutes continue:
Nothing contained in this title shall take away or be construed to
take away or discharge any rents certain, or other rights incident
or belonging to tenure in common socage created prior to July fourth,
one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six, and due or to grow
due to this state or any person, or the distresses incident thereto.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 46.3-4 (1994).
The South Carolina Code provides: 'The only tenure of land in this State is that of
free and common socage." S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-5-10 (Law Co-op. 1993).
The case of Charping v. J.P. Scurry and Co. 372 S.E.2d 120 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)
involved the question of the enforceability of a covenant limiting future construction on
a parcel of land to four residential units included in the deed to the land. The majority
concluded that the covenant was a personal and not a real one, and was not enforceable
on the facts of this case. In dissent, Judge Gardner argued that the covenant might be
more appropriately interpreted as a real one and went on to maintain that the Court
might have resolved this question more appropriately through reliance on common-law
socage tenure. Id. at 125 ("It would, in my mind, be more appropriate to apply the
principles of the common law .... in the form of free and common socage... ").
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A. Origins of Knight Service and Wardship
Knight service was "[t]he most honourable and most burdensome of the
freehold tenures ..... ,42 To understand the order that the revolutionaries
uprooted one must first appreciate the main lines of that order. It was-and
remains-a truism of English property law that all land is held either mediately
or immediately from the Crown. But the meaning of this truism has changed
significantly over the centuries. Indeed, the most important transformation
that this truism underwent occurred in the middle decades of the seventeenth
century, as a direct result of the English Revolution.
In the fifteenth-century world represented by a work like Thomas Littleton's
Treatiseon Tenures,43 one encounters a baffling array of ways in which one might
hold land. Grand serjeanty, petit serjeanty, knight service, frankalmoign, and
other tenures were among the most important, but by no means the only
tenures.44 Each of these tenures, again, might be held directly of the Crown, or
indirectly, through a lord, and could be distinguished one from the other on
the basis of the service the tenant owed the lord or the Crown.45 But from the
standpoint of the leaders of English Revolution, it was knight service that stood
out as a uniquely onerous institution, because it was knight service that
provided the Crown with the means of imposing burdensome and essentially
"irrational" fees and assessments on the gentry.
Knight-service had its origin in the days following William I's Conquest of
England in 1066. William parceled out land as a reward to those loyal retainers
who fought at his side at the Battle of Hastings. The land was conferred on the
basis of proven martial prowess, with the expectation that those
tenants-in-chief who held directly of the king would provide similar service in
the future, should it be required. 46 And while the king was the only person in
England legally permitted to raise an army, William's tenants-in-chief were
nevertheless permitted to parcel out the land they held of the Crown to other
4 2 ERc KERRIDGE, AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 33
(1969).
4 3 See LYTrLETON, HIs TREATISE ON TENURES, (Garland Publishing 1978) (T.E. Tomlins,
ed., 1841).
44See SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 6-15 (summarizing the major tenures). Grand
serjeanty was the holding of land "in return for some service of a personal nature, which
was to be performed for the lord of whom the lands were held." Id. at 9. Petty serjeanty
involved the holding of lands in return for "providing the King with some small article
pertaining to war .... "d. at 14. Frankalmoin "was created when lands were granted
in return for an obligation to perform spiritual services on behalf of the grantor, and it
came to be essential that no secular services could be reserved in the grant." Id. at 10.
Knight service is explained infra at notes 46-50, and accompanying text.
451d. at 6-7.
46See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at I-l, 38; and SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 2.
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loyal retainers-called mesne lords-in return for service within an
agreed-upon number of knights the lord was obliged to provide the king.
47
By the time one reaches Henry 11 (1154-1189), however, knight service was
being regularly commuted for a money payment known as scutage. Henry's
tenants-in-chief, in turn, began as well to commute the military service required
of their retainers to scutage payments.4 8 By the end of the fourteenth century,
however, scutage itself seems to have disappeared, "superseded by other and
newer forms of taxation."4 9 And by the time one reaches Littleton's century,
accordingly, scutage had become "purely notional" and "never in practice
exacted."50
But scutage was not the only money payment (called generically the "feudal
incidents") tenants-in-chief and mesne lords were required to make. An array
of payments or services might be demanded of the tenant, most of which might
be traced back to the character of the granting of land in knight service by
William the Conqueror.
The most important feudal incidents for our purposes were relief and
wardship. In theory-as well, it seems, in practice-knight-service was
originally non-inheritable. After all, there is no necessary reason to expect that
one's son automatically had the military talents that made his father so
particularly valued to William's campaign.5 1 But already by the early twelfth
century this principle was being relaxed in practice. While one might lack a
legal right to claim an estate by knight service, one might nevertheless "take it
up on payment of a just and lawful relief."52 "[This [practice] amounts to a
recognition of the right of the heir to inherit, or perhaps be regranted the
lands."53
Wardship is the other feudal incident relevant to our account. "Wardship
means two things, wardship of the land, and wardship of the body[.]" 54
Wardship of the land meant simply this: that where a tenant dies seised of a
freehold estate leaving an heir who has not yet reached the age of majority, the
47 See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at U1, 39 (discussing "the policy of the Norman kings
... that military service was due to no one but the king .... ); and at 40 (discussing the
relationship of mesne lords to tenants-in-chief and the Crown).
4 81d. at 42.
49 d. at 45.
SOSIMRPsON, supra note 40, at 7.
51Id. at 16.
521d. Cf. PLucKNETr, supra note 2, at 534 (elaborating on the concept of feudal relief).
53SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 17. Closely related to the payment of relief was the
doctrine of primer seisin, which was an additional payment the tenant-in-chief had to
make to the king in order to be seised of the estate. Id. at 17-18.
54PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 534.
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lord may retain the land and profits until the heir reaches his majority.55
Similarly, wardship of the body meant this much: that the lord must provide
for the maintenance and education of the ward, but might also arrange the
ward's marriage.56 While the ward was not "compelled to accept the marriage"
... "refusal was a serious thing."57 Where the ward rejected the lord's choice of
a spouse, he "might then have to forfeit the value of the marriage to his lord."58
It must be stressed that these incidents pertained only to lands held by knight
service.59 Indeed, the common law evolved a sophisticated system of
guardianship to protect minors who inherited land held in socage tenure.60
By the late fifteenth century, wardship, relief, and the other feudal incidents
pertaining to the Crown were in the process of falling into desuetude. Much
land was already held in socage tenure. And even where land was held in
knight service, Chancery had developed a system that had begun to serve as
an alternative to the common law scheme of estates, of which knight service
and its accompanying feudal incidents were a part. This alternative
system-based on the feoffment to uses-allowed the routine evasion of feudal
obligations,61 and is explored below in our discussion of the
seventeenth-century creation of modem equity.62
The loss of revenue from the feudal incidents came to be acutely felt
beginning with the accession to the throne of the Tudor dynasty in the person
of Henry VII, and even more so, during the reign of his son, the ambitious and
restless Henry VIII. The feudal incidents represented an untapped and
promising source of funds.
55Id. It was also the case that the lord was not accountable to his ward. According to
Simpson: "The lord was not accountable for the profits of the land, but could treat the
wardship as an assignable right; in fact, wardships were boughtand sold as investments
and were the most lucrative of the incidents of tenure." SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 18.
56 See SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 18.
57Id.
58Id.
59Holdsworth states: "These rights of wardship and marriage were confined to the
tenures by knight service and grand sergeanty. They were never extended to socage and
petty serjeanty." HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at m, 65.
6OThis system is reviewed at id. 65-66. In the fifteenth century, one finds Littleton
defining socage tenure negatively in the following terms: "'Tenure in Socage is, where
the tenant holdeth of his lord the tenancieby certeine [i.e., definite] service for all manner
of service, so that the service be not knights service."' LrILETON, supra note 43, § 117
(quoted in SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 11). Simpson notes that socage is "the only tenure
of any importance met with in modem land law." Id. at 11.
61Simpson notes that by the time one reaches the early Tudor period "the technique
of evading incidents had reached a perfection which a modem income tax practitioner
might well envy." SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 21.
62 See infra at notes 249-64 and accompanying text.
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B. The Sixteenth-Century Revival of the Feudal Incidents
Pressed for new sources of revenue, Henry VIII began a two-pronged attack
on the evasion of income represented by the feoffment to uses. One prong of
this attack, the enactment of the Statute of Uses, is explored below in connection
with the creation of modem Chancery beginning in the 1660s.63 The second
prong of this attack, with which we are presently concerned, was the revival
of the feudal incidents, especially relief and wardship.64
Early in his reign, Henry decided to continue the policy first established by
his father of searching out "hidden" instances of knight service.65 Where a
landholder was found to hold a portion of his lands in knight service, relief and
wardship might be claimed from the landholder and his heirs.66 Henry VIII
would direct the money so received from relief payments be placed-not, as
one might expect, in the Exchequer-but in the King's Chamber, and-in order
to realize immediate profit-would often have the wardships so obtained put
up for sale on what had become a flourishing market in the sale and resale of
these valuable rights. 6 7
Reliance on knight service and its attendant feudal incidents became an even
more important instrument of royal policy beginning in the mid-1530s with
Henry VIII's seizure and sale of monastic and ecclesiastical lands. In 1509, the
year of Henry's coronation, several million acres of land were under Church
control.68 This wealth was "the accumulation of nearly a thousand years of
endowments and purchases" 69 and was a very inviting target for a government
that had just declared itself free from the Roman Church and had already taken
steps to discredit a celibate clergy and the monastic life.70 In 1535, Henry
ordered that a comprehensive survey of the wealth of the monasteries be under-
63 See infra at notes 265-73, and accompanying text.
64This attack had important antecedents in the reign of Henry VII, who was the first
to realize the importance both of relief, and especially of wardship, to Crown revenue.
See JOEL HURSTFIELD, THE QUEEN'S WARDS: WARDSHIP AND MARRIAGE UNDER ELIZABETH
1 (1958). It was through Henry VII's machinations that wardship, "[an antiquated and
moribund institution[,] was called back to life for a totally irrelevant purpose: revenue."
Id. at 7.
65See Joel Hurstfield, The Revival of Feudalism in Early Tudor England, 37 HIST. 131,
135-36 (1952).
66 1d. at 134-35.
67 Id. at 136.
68 See CHRISTOPHER CLAY, I ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ENGLAND,
1500-1700, at 144 (PEOPLE, LAND, AND TOWNS) (1984).
69 W.G. HOSKINS, THE AGE OF PLUNDER: KING HENRY'S ENGLAND, 1500-1547 at 22
(1976).
7OSee generally DAVID KNOWLES, BARE RUINED CHOIRS: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
ENGLISH MONASTERIES (1976).
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taken, a task that was performed with alacrity and thoroughness. 71 In January,
1536, then, armed with carefully collected data on the wealth of the
monasteries, Henry had his allies in Parliament introduce an act dissolving all
monasteries worth less than two hundred pounds. 72 The large monasteries,
those worth more than two hundred pounds, were subsequently dissolved
individually in the years 1538-1540.73 Two-thirds of all monastic holdings were
sold to private parties before 1547, while much of the remaining ecclesiastical
property of England-monastic lands as well as the holdings of episcopal sees,
collegiate churches and innumerable other ecclesiastical entities-was sold by
1554.74
What was significant about the sale of these lands was that Henry VIII made
sure to require that most monastic lands sold to private parties were "[held] by
knight-service of the Crown."75 What this meant in practice was that the Crown
could claim feudal dues from individual landholders if so little as a single acre
of their aggregate holdings was held as knight service.76
71 The results of this survey were recorded in a work known as the Valor Ecclesiasticus,
"Ecclesiastical Wealth." This survey was the subjectof an important study by ALEXANDER
SAvINE, ENGLISH MONASTERIES ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION (1909), which remains
valuable for its contribution to our knowledge of the monastic wealth during Henry
VIII's reign. Scholars today continue to agree that '[t]he dissolution of the Monasteries
has taken its place in historical studies... as a revolution in landownership, second only
to that which followed the Norman Conquest." JOYCE YOUINGs, THE DISsoLurIONOF THE
MONASTERIES 15 (1971).
72 See GEOFFREY R. ELTON, REFORM AND REFORMATION: ENGLAND, 1509-1558 234-35
(1977).
73Id. at 235.
74 See CLAY, supra note 68, at 145. Cf. H.J. Habakkuk, The Market for Monastic Property,
1539-1603, 10 EcON. HIST. REV. 362 (2d series, 1958) (analyzing in detail the market in
monastic lands until the opening decade of the seventeenth century).
75HURSTFIELD, supra note 64, at 10.
76Id. at 6. A large array of feudal incidents were implicated in the sale of the monastic
lands.
[T]here were. . .charges to which the purchaser became liable.
He was normally obliged to pay an annual rent and, more impor-
tant still, in the vast majority of cases the recipient was required to
hold his lands in knight service in capite. By the creation of the
military tenure in chief, the crown in effect reserved to itself the
various feudal incidents associated with that relationship, of which
the most important were wardship and livery, that is, payment by
the heir of a premium before entering upon his lands. In the pay-
ment in livery we have in essence the primitive notion of death
duties. Moreover, even when the lands were divided and sub-
divided, they brought with them to each of the purchasers these
burdens and 'casualties.'
HURSTFIELD, supra note 65, at 137.
It became apparent by the latter decades of the sixteenth century that the sale of
the monastic and ecclesiastical lands was only a temporary expedient for solving the
Crown's cash flow problems. The English monarchs, however, continued to resort to
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The sale of these lands effectively created a flood of new feudal incidents
and wardships. In 1540, accordingly, there was established by statute a court,
called the Court of Wards and Liveries, which had competence over the feudal
incidents, especially wardship.77 The Court was empowered to conduct
"inquisitions post mortem" to determine whether any parts of the estates of the
deceased property-holder were held of knight service or were otherwise held
immediately of the Crown.78 Where the Court reached an affirmative decision,
the landholder or his heir thereby became responsible for all of the feudal
incidents, including wardship.
The Court of Wards reached the apex of its success during the tenure of
Robert Cecil, Lord Burghley (1599-1612). Burghley succeeded in identifying
and pursuing on behalf of the Crown increasing numbers of wardships
throughout his time as Master of Wards, but his final years on the bench
coincided with--and quite possibly incited-widespread loathing of the whole
institution of wardship among the populace, in particular, members of the
gentry.79
the sale of real estate as a means of addressing financial needs right up to the eve of the
Revolution. Christoper Clay states:
By 1640, therefore, the landed property of the Crown had been largely
whittled away. Most of the ancient royal forests remained, even though
some of these had been disafforested and sold off, and the sovereign
still had a wide selection of palaces and parks to choose from, but of
the many hundreds of rent yielding manors and farms which had still
belonged to Queen Elizabeth at her accession, only a scattered remnant
survived.
CLAY, supra note 68, at 145.
7 7Hurstfield has explained how the Court became a revenue collection device:
After forty years of trial and error, the Crown in 1540 knew exactly
where it stood. It was fully armed with a Court of Wards and a body
of skilled officials. It had asserted its rights. If a tenant of the Crown
died while holding land by a so-called knight service, then his heir,
if under age, became a ward of the Crown. He rarely stayed a royal
ward except in name. Soon his guardianship would be sold, some-
times to his mother, more often to a complete stranger. With his guardian-
ship would go his 'ma rriage'-the right to offer him a bride whom he
could rarely afford to refuse, for his refusal meant that he must pay a
crushing fine to his guardian. Meanwhile, his land would also have
passed into wardship, either to his guardian or to someone else, for
them to snatch a quick profit until the ward was old enough to
reclaim his own.
HURSTFIELD, supra note 64, at 18.
78 The procedure of inquisition post mortem is explained in H.E. BELL, AN
INTRODUCTIONTOTHE HISTORYAND RECORDSOFTHE COURTOF WARDS AND LIVERIES 69-70
(1953). It was the duty of county officials-who themselves had an interest in the
proceedings-to notify the Court of the deaths of tenants who might be seised in some
part of their estate, of Crown lands. Id. at 70.
79 See HURSTFIELD, supra note 64, at 260-282 (documenting Lord Burghley's tenure,
his success, and the popular complaints lodged against his rule).
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C. Popular Resistance to the Feudal Incidents and the Eradication of the Practice
By the early years of the seventeenth century, the Court of Wards was rapidly
becoming a very unpopular court. The practice of wardship itself was falling
into disrepute.80 Enforced marriage, the essential premise on which the whole
practice of wardship rested, was increasingly under attack, both by the new
urban classes and by a gentry that felt it infringed on the freedom to arrange
one's personal affairs.81 It was even satirized on the London stage in the play
The Miseries of Inforst Marriage, by George Wilkins (1607).82
Wardship came under attack for other reasons as well. It was seen to violate
basic human dignity and sound economic practice. This attack was first put
classically by that diplomat and regius professor of law, Sir Thomas Smith
(1513-1577) in his De Republica Anglorum, published posthumously in 1583:
Many men doe esteeme this wardship by knightes service verie
unreasonable and unjust, and contrarie to nature, that a Freeman and
Gentleman should be bought and solde like an horse or an oxe, and so
change gardians as masters and lordes: at whose govemement not
onely his bodie but his landes and his houses should be, to be wasted
and spent without accounts, and then to marie at the will of him, who
is his naturall Lorde, or his will who hath bought him, to such as he
like not peradventure, or else to pay so great a ransome.... So he, who
had a father, which kept a good house, and had all things in order to
maintain it, shall come to his owne, after he is out of wardshippe,
woods decayed, houses fallen down, stocke wasted and gone, land let
foorth and plowed to the bare and to make amends, shall paye yet one
yeares rent for relief and ouster le maind, beside other charges, so that
not of manie yeres and peradventure never he shall be able to recover,
and to the estate where his father left it.
83
80 See BELL, supra note 78, at 133-149 (providing a detailed account of the steady
decline of the Court of Wards in public esteem).
8 1See STONE, supra note 30, at 603-604. Stone identifies two phases to the attack on
enforced marriage. The first phase, which began in the late sixteenth century, criticized
wardship as violating the natural rights of parents and relatives to see to the education
and marriage of their offspring. The second phase, which flourished in the first decades
of the seventeenth century, criticized wardship for violating the free choice of the
spouses. The second phase, Stone indicates, was far more radical, and shifted "from
criticism of the abuses of the system to direct attacks on the system itself." Id. at 604.
82 See GEORGE WILKINs, THE MISERIES OF INFORST MARRIAGE (1607 reprinted 1963). See
also Glenn H. Blayney, Wardship in English Drama (1600-1650), 53 STUD. PHILOLOGY 470
(1956). Blayney argues that by the first decades of the seventeenth century wardship
had come to be considered "a social evil," and was the target of a number of dramatic
attacks. Id. at 470-84. To emphasize the widespread nature of the attacks on wardship,
Blayney makes a persuasive case that Shakespeare's All's Well that Ends Well can only
be understood against the backdrop of pervasive criticism of wardship. Id. at 477-78.
83 THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 128-29 (Mary Dewar, ed., 1982).
[Vol. 43:221
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/4
17TH CENTURY ENGLISH LAND LAW
These criticisms began to resonate politically. As early as 1584, the Court of
Wards was attacked as a prerogative court and therefore illegitimate.84 The
issue of abolishing the Court of Wards was raised for the first time in
governmental circles in James I's first Parliament, in 1603-1604.85 The issue of
abolition was taken up again in 1609-1610.86 Appreciative of the need to
provide a substitute for the loss of funds abolition of wardship represented,
Parliament proposed that an annual tax take its place, but these proposals went
nowhere.87 Finally, "[iun 1621, the House of Commons set up a committee" to
investigate complaints against the Court of Wards and--one has the
impression-this committee was kept rather active by petitioners who felt their
causes had been mishandled. 88
The Crown, however, remained inattentive to the agitation against the feudal
incidents. Charles I, during his period of personal rule, came to view wardship
as a vitally important source of revenue. The 1630s witnessed a number of
efforts on the part of Charles's Masters of Wards to devise increasingly clever
means of extracting larger sums from those subject to wardship.89 Popular
resentment only grew more intense.90
The parliamentarians who opposed Charles, not surprisingly, targeted the
Court of Wards for elimination. It was a court, in the eyes of many
parliamentarians, as onerous as Star Chamber. The Grand Remonstrance of the
Long Parliament attacked the Court as "hav[ing] been grievous in exceeding
[its] jurisdiction" and as "weaken[ing]" and "ruin[ing]" "the estate of many
families."91 Parliament considered a variety of expedients for replacing the
Court of Wards, and finally declared the institution abolished on 24 February,
1645,92 a declaration that was confirmed in 1660, in the "Act for taking away
the Court of Wards and Liveries, and Tenures in capite, and by Knights-Service"
(popularly known as the "Statute of Tenures" and "plausibly ascribed to" Sir
Matthew Hale).93 This statute also outlawed the feudal incidents and declared
84 See BELL, supra note 78, at 135. Plucknett, however, asserts that the Court of Wards
should be numbered among "those predominantly common law courts which were...
the creation of the Tudors .... PLucKNETr, supra, note 2, at 174.
85 See BELL, supra note 78, at 138.
861d. at 139-41.
871d. at 140-41.
88 d.
89 These efforts are documented in SHARPE, supra note 16, at 108.
901d.
91 CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625-1660 213 (Samuel
Rawson Gardiner, ed., 3d ed. 1958).
92 See BELL, supra note 78, at 158-59.
93 The text of the statute is found at 12 Car. II c. 24 (1660). On the Statute's authorship,
SeeCHALLIS'SLAWOF REAL PROPERTY, CHIEFLYIN RELATIONTO CONVEYANCING 23 (Charles
Sweet ed., 3d ed. 1911). Matthew Hale was one of the most important of the
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that henceforth "all Tenures hereafter to be created by the King's Majesty his
Heirs or Successors... shall be adjudged to be in free and common Socage only
.... "94 The English land law was to be put upon a new foundation. No longer
could the Crown create tenures that carried with them irrational fees or
obligations. Free and common socage, that is socage freed of feudal obligations,
would henceforth be the only tenure the Crown might create.
Perhaps the final word on the importance of these developments can be
found in Sir William Blackstone, that late but crucial spokesman for the
parliamentary ideology. To Blackstone, the statute outlawing the Court of
Wards and knight's service was more important to the civil property of the
realm than even Magna Carta. Blackstone explained:
[It was a] statute, which was a greater acquisition to the civil property
of this kingdom than even Magna Carta itself; since that only pruned
the luxuriances that had grown out of the military tenures, and thereby
preserved them in vigour; but the Statute of King Charles [abolishing
the Court of Wards] extirpated the whole, and demolished both root
and branches.
95
mid-seventeenth century lawyers. For a biography, see A.W.B. SIMPSON, BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAw 220-222 (1984). For his contribution to legal
philosophy, see Berman, supra note 3, at 1702-21. For Hale's contribution to the
development of the modem mortgage, see infra notes 331-33, and accompanying text.
For a biography of Hale, see EDMUND HEWARD, MATTHEW HALE (1972).
9 41d.
95f- WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 77 (reprinted in
1966). Blackstone's attack on knight serviceand wardship, and all of the feudal incidents,
was unrelenting. He continued:
For the present, I have only to observe, that by the degenerating of
knight-service, or personal military duty, into escuage, or pecuniary
assessments, all the advantages (either promised or real) of the feodal
constitution were destroyed, and nothing but the hardships remained.
Instead of forming a national militia composed of barons, knights, and
gentlemen bound by their interest, their honour and their oaths, to
defend their king and country, the whole of this system of tenures now
tended to nothing else, but a wretched means of raising money to pay
an army of occasional mercenaries. In the mean time, the families of all
our nobility and gentry groaned under the intolerable burthens, which
(in consequence of the fiction adopted after the Conquest) were intro-
duced and laid upon them by the subtlety and finesse of the Norman
lawyers. For, besides the scutages they were liable to in defect of
personal attendance, which, however, were assessed by themselves in
Parliament, they might be called upon by the king or lord paramount
for aids, whenever his eldest son was to be knighted, or his eldest
daughter married; not to forget the ransom of his own person. The
heir, on the death of his ancestor, if of full age, was plundered of the
first emoluments arising from his inheritance, by way of relief or primer
seisin; and, if under age, of the whole of his estate during infancy. And
then, as Sir Thomas Smith very feelingly complains, 'when he came
into his own, after he was out of wardship, his woods decayed, houses
fallen down, stock wasted and gone, lands let forth and ploughed to
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III. THE ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT, THE DOMESTICATION OF COPYHOLD, AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF RIGHTS IN COMMON
A. Background to the Enclosure Movement of the Seventeenth Century
The word "enclosure" is one of those loaded terms of English historiography.
The term itself has a certain chameleon quality in that it takes on particular
colorations of meaning depending on the intentions of the user. Joan Thirsk has
proposed a definition that-while laconic-is nevertheless useful for our
purposes. She has described the enclosure of land as the process of
"extinguish[ing] common rights over it .... "96 Because common rights were
be barren,' to make amends he was yet to pay half a year's profits as
a fine for suing out his livery; and also the price or value of his mar-
riage, if he refused such wife as his lord and guardian had bartered
for, and imposed on him; or twice that value, if he married another
woman. Add to this, the untimely and expensive honour of knighthood,
to make his poverty more completely splendid. And when by these
deductions his fortune was so shattered and ruined, that perhaps he
was obliged to sell his patrimony, he had not even that poor privilege
allowed him, without paying an exorbitant fine for a license of alienation.
Id. at 75-76.
Modem scholars share Blackstone's enthusiasm for the achievement of the Statute
of Tenures and the abolition of the feudal incidents. Peter Roebuck has offered the
following synthesis:
Major emphasis has been placed on the political significance of the final
abolition of the Court of Wards and Liveries in 1660. Not only did it
remove a substantial source of grievance against the crown but, as part
of a wider settlement whereby Charles H1 surrendered ancient dues in
return for revenue granted by Parliament, it formed a major signpost
on the road from a feudal to a constitutional monarchy....
It has been suggested that the more substantial landowners benefited
in three respects from abolition: fiscally; collectively, in relation to other
groups in rural society; and managerially, insofar as the reform increased
their capacity to conduct their affairs effectively. Their financial position
improved with the disappearance of the feudal exactions associated with
wardship to which the majority of them had previously been liable....
Secondly... landowners were able, much more easily than hitherto, to
bend copyholders to their will in matters relating to agricultural im-
provement.... The third suggestion is that, because following the
abolition of feudal tenures ownership of land became absolute,
future prospects for long-term planning and investment by land-
owners were greatly enhanced. Once free of the threat of periodic
interference from the crown or its agents, proprietorial confidence
grew and was reflected in the way in which the management of
landed wealth was exercised.
Peter Roebuck, Post-Restoration Landownership: The Impact of the Abolition of Wardship, 18
J. BRIT. STUD. 67, 67-68 (1978).
96 Joan Thirsk, Enclosing and Engrossing, in IV THE AGRARIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND
AND WALES, 1500-1640 200 (H.P.R. Finberg, ed. 1967).
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being eliminated, furthermore, "it was usual for the encloser to hedge or fence
the land."9 7
Establishing a chronology for the enclosure movement has been a difficult
and contentious task. Thirsk notes that enclosure as she has defined it had been
a feature of English life since at least the year 1000.98 But beginning in the years
after 1500 the process began to arouse intense feelings of popular outrage.9 9
The popular resistance that began under the early Tudors has caused some
historians to see the sixteenth century as pivotal for the emergence of enclosure.
Tawney, for example, argued that the progress made by enclosure in the
sixteenth century was crucial to "the undermining of the small farmer's
position" and that the sixteenth century may therefore "be regarded as a long
step in the commercialising of English life."100
Economic historians in the decades after Tawney wrote have quarreled with
his chronology. The enclosure movement might have been the focus of social
criticism in the sixteenth century, but-so it was claimed-it was really the
eighteenth century when it came into the ascendance. D.N. McCloskey speaks
for this school of thought when he states: "The eighteenth century, then, in the
second half of which Parliament added broad powers of compulsion to the
tools available for dismantling the open-field system, is the pre-eminent
century of English enclosure."101
This view has now been effectively challenged. The seventeenth century has
come to be seen as crucially important to the enclosure's movement growth
and consolidation. J.R. Wordie, for instance, writes: "It was during the
9 71d. Closely related to the process of enclosure is that of engrossing, which involved
"the amalgamation of two or more farms into one. The superfluous farmhouse was either
left to fall into decay, or, with a small piece of land attached to it, was down-graded to
accommodate a cottager." Id. at 201. Enclosure is our specific concern in this Article,
because Parliament's attitude toward it, changing from implacable hostility to warm
approbation, represents the triumph of what had become, by the mid-seventeenth
century, the gentry's program.
981d. at 201.
9 9Thirsk states:
Enclosing and engrossing were two of the most controversial topics
in sixteenth-century England. They provoked animated discussion
in the alehouses, inspired outspoken sermons from the pulpit, and
stirred passions and community loyalties in the fields and muttered
imprecations against the selfish and the rich. They incited many
minor local riots and one larger disturbance, which spread across
three Midland counties.
Id. at 200.
100R.H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SI)CEENTH CENTURY 2-3 (1912
reprinted, 1961).
101D.N. McCloskey, The Economics of Enclosure: A Market Analysis, in EUROPEAN
PEASANTS ANDTHEIR MARKETS 125 (William N. Parker & Eric L. Jones eds., 1975) (quoted
in J.R. Wordie, The Chronology of English Enclosure, 1500-1914, 36 EcoN. HIST. REV. 483
(2d series, 1983)).
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seventeenth century that England swung from being mainly an open-field
country to being mainly an enclosed one."102 Wordie bases this conclusion on
a review of scholarship that establishes that relatively little enclosure occurred
in the sixteenth century in spite--or perhaps because of-the vast popular
resistance and that by the mid-eighteenth century "three-quarters of England
was enclosed." 103
While economic historians have been actively engaged in establishing the
chronology of enclosure, less has been said about its legal aspects. Early on,
Tawney recognized that enclosure must have presupposed a legal revolution
as much as an economic revolution. On Tawney's account, the enclosure
movement was made possible by the lawyers' abandonment of copyhold-the
generic term used to describe the property rights of small landholders-in
favor of leasehold. 104
Our account is concerned chiefly with the legal implications of the enclosure
movement. Economic history will be employed where it elucidates the path the
enclosure movement followed, but it will not be the chief focus of our inquiry.
From the vantage point of legal history, Tawney was correct to focus on
copyhold as crucial to understanding the progress of the enclosure movement,
but it was only in the seventeenth century, especially in its second half, that
copyhold would be pushed from the center of English debates over enclosure
to the margins. The seventeenth century witnessed an effort to consolidate
numerous small holdings held by individual yeomen and peasants in the hands
of larger, more efficient, land-holders. This movement to consolidate took the
form of a struggle to diminish--or even eliminate altogether-copyhold rights.
But the enclosure movement has a paradoxical aspect to it where legal
history is concerned. It involved an attack on copyhold, which was
preeminently the individual rights small landholders enjoyed over particular
parcels of land, and the limiting of access to open fields and the exercise of
rights held in common by broadly defined and diffuse groups of individuals.
The enclosure movement attacked both of these practices. In its attack on
common rights, the enclosure movement was the particular beneficiary of
1 02 Id. at 495.
10 3Id. at 488. It must also be noted that significant enclosures occurred prior to the
sixteenth century. See MAURICE BERESFORD, THE LOST VILLAGESOF ENGLAND 102-5 (1987)
(discussing fifteenth-century enclosures).
104Tawney wrote:
From a legal point of view, the great feature of the period is the
struggle between copyhold and leasehold, and the ground gained
by the latter. Before the century begins, leases for years, though
common enough on the demesne lands and on land taken from
waste, are the exceptions so far as concerns the land of the customary
tenants. When the century closes, leasehold has won many obstinately
resisted triumphs; much land that was formerly held by copy of court
roll is held by lease; and copyhold tenure itself, through the weakening
of manorial custom, has partially changed its character.
TAWNEY, supra note 100, at 1.
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steadily increasing amounts of parliamentary legislation through the latter half
of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. Both of these
developments-the attack on copyhold and the the movement for
parliamentary enclosure-will be explored below.
B. The Attack on Copyhold
1. Fifteenth-Century Conditions
Historians have traditionally employed the colorful expression "bastard
feudalism" to describe English economic relations in the fifteenth century, and
even though J.M.W. Bean has recently cautioned against the use of this term,
Bean also concedes that "if we construe 'feudalism' in England as a body of
relationships between lord and man that was based on the tenure of land, the
characteristics of late medieval lordship are distinctly different [from what had
gone before]." 105 Our own concern in discussing enclosures is with the
manorial economy that set the background for this movement. The manorial
economy that had characterized the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth
centuries-which had at its foundation the unfree labor of villeins (serfs)-was
devastated in the mid-fourteenth century by the epidemic of bubonic plague
10 5The term "bastard feudalism" was first used with its modem meaning by K.B.
McFarlane. See K.B. McFarlane, Bastard Feudalism, 20 BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF
HISTORICAL RESEARCH 161 (1945) reprinted in K.B. MCFARLANE, ENGLAND IN THE
FIFTEENTH CENIRY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 23 (1981). Roughly put, McFarlane's use of this
term was meant to signify a shift in the organization of society from tenure to contract.
Classic feudalism was organized around the principle that the great lords of the king
would hold land in return for the reciprocal obligation to perform military service. But
by the fifteenth century, the king no longer relied on his great lords for military service
but rather entered into contractual relationships with military leaders, essentially
mercenaries, who agreed to furnish specified numbers of troops in return for cash
payments.
McFarlane goes into considerable detail about the sort of contractual relationships
that governed the relations among monarch, military leaders, and troops. It is the
specifics of McFarlane's research into these contractual relationships that Bean calls into
question. SeegenerallyJ.M.W. BEAN, FROM LORDTO PATRON: LORDSHIPINLATEMEDIEVAL
ENGLAND (1989) (exhaustively analyzing indentures and patent rolls to demonstrate that
the system did not work as McFarlane described it). But even if "bastard feudalism" does
not carry exactly the meaning McFarlane ascribed to it, it remains a useful term for the
way it signifies the very different set of economic relationships that had come into being
in the fifteenth century.
This whole controversy has recently been reviewed by Michael Hicks, who tries to
reconcile Bean and McFarlane. While McFarlane's focus was too narrow to be sustained
indefinitely without serious qualification, Bean has himself drawn gone too far in
criticizing his conclusions. Hicks has proposed an understanding of the concept of
bastard feudalism sensitive to modem research on fifteenth-century England. See
MICHAEL HIcKS, BASTARD FEUDALISM 1-42 (1995) (analyzing the controversy between
McFarlane and Bean); id. at 43-68 (proposing the existence of several "varieties" of
bastard feudalism).
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known as the Black Death and subsequently collapsed. 106 Of course, manors
themselves, understood as estates held by large landholders, did not cease to
exist; indeed, they remained a large part of the English countryside, but they
functioned along very different lines after the mid-fourteenth century.
Emerging from the wreckage of the traditional manorial economy was a new
class of yeomen. Yeomen have been described as "wealthy villagers whose
appearance is one of the most signficant social developments of the later
Middle Ages."107 Economically and socially, there were substantial differences
within the class of yeomen.108 But despite the existence of considerable
differences between and among individual yeomen, one can nevertheless
distill some generalizations about them from recent work on the subject.
Yeomen tended to come from peasant backgrounds, but were men who had
themselves held positions of responsibility within the manorial economy or
whose families had exercised such responsibility.109 It has been estimated that
"[p]robably most villages had one or two families who were at least
approaching yeoman status, although they must have formed a very small
proportion of the rural population as a whole, possibly no more than three or
four per cent."110 In the course of the fifteenth century, the new class of yeomen
"acquired a substantial proprietary interest in the soil."111 It is this "substantial
proprietary interest" that came to be known as "copyhold."
2. The Creation and Judicial Protection of Copyhold
The term "copyhold" was short hand for "tenure by copy of the court roll
according to the custom of the manor."112 Littleton defined copyhold thus:
Tenant by copy of court roll is, as if a man be seised of a manor, within
which manor there is a custom and hath been in use, time out of mind
of man, that certain tenants within the same manor have used to have
lands and tenements to hold to them and their heirs, in fee-simple, or
fee-tail, or for term of life, etc., at the will of the lord according to the
custom of the same manor. And such a tenant may not alien the land
by deed; for then the lord may enter as to a thing forfeit to him, but if
106 See ROBERT C. ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN 64 (1992) ("[tjhe manorial
system... lasted from the end of the eleventh century until the late fourteenth. It
collapsed under the impact of the Black Death of 1348-9 and the subsequent century of
population decline").
107CLAY, supra note 68, at 57.
108 See F.R.H. Du Boulay, Who Were Farming the English Demesnes at the End oftheMiddle
Ages? 17 ECON. HIST. REV. 443 (2d series 1965). There was "a considerable difference
between... yeomen and yeomen." Id. at 451.
10 9See CLAY, supra note 68, at 57.
110d at 58.
1 11ALLEN, supra note 106, at 66.
1 12 R.H. HILTON, THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 48 (2d ed. 1983).
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he will alien his land to another, it behoveth him according to the
custom to surrender the tenements at some court, etc., into the hand
of the lord, to the use of him that shall have the estate, in such form or
effect.
113
The relationship of the copyholder to the lord requires special emphasis.
First, copyhold was a sort of inferior estate that existed within a manor held in
fee simple by a lord.114 This was an uneasy fit, since, according to Littleton,
copyhold might also be held in fee simple or fee-tail. Littleton states further
that copyhold was held "at the will of the lord according to the custom of the
manor." One might take this passage, referring as it does to the "will of the lord,"
as stating that copyhold was held at the sufferance of the lord, and such an
interpretation might-or might not--have been true for Littleton's age.115 But
by the time one reaches the time of Sir Edward Coke, a different gloss was put
on this expression. Coke interpreted this passage as referring only "to the
'commencement of the tenant's title,"'1 1 6 and Leadam, the great
nineteenth-century historian of the enclosure movement, concurs with Coke
that the reference to the "will of the lord" must not be understood as establishing
a tenancy at will.117 Finally, it must be noted that even though a copyholder
might have a fee simple or fee-tail interest in his copyhold, he was not free to
alienate it, although he might enfeoff the estate to the lord for the benefit of
113LnrILETON, supra note 43, at § 73.
114Although Littleton does not make the point sufficiently clear, it seems that the
lord's interest in the manor could co-exist with the copyholder's interest in his estate
because the two estates were grounded ultimately in different systems of law. The lord,
regardless of the nature of his tenure, held by the common law, while the copyholder
held in virtue of customary law. See KERRIDGE, supra note 42, 60-61.
115For a discussion of the problems posed in interpreting the expression "at the wiln
of the lord according to the custom of the manor" in fifteenth-century texts, see CHARLES
MONTGOMERY GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY, AND THE COMMON LAW 23-33 (1963).
116SIR EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER, § 32 (1630) (quoted in I.S. Leadam,
The Security of Copyholders in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, 8 ENG. HIST. REV. 684,
690(1893).
Coke elsewhere elaborates upon the limitations placed upon the lord's will:
But now copyholders stand upon a sure ground, now they weigh
not their lord's displeasure, they shake not at every sudden blast
of wind, they eat, drink, and sleep securely, only having a special
care of the main chance, viz., to perform carefully what duties and
services soever their tenure doth exact and custom doth require;
then let lord frown, the copyholder cares not, knowing himself safe
and not within any danger, for if the lord's anger grows to expulsion,
the law hath provided several weapons of remedy, for it is at his
election whether to sue a subpoena or an action of trespass against
the lord. Time hath dealt very favourably with copyholders in divers
respects.
COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER, sec. 9 quoted in KERRIDGE, supra note 42, at 163.
1171d. at 690.
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some third party. In this way, the geographic integrity of the larger manor is
maintained.
While much about the origin of copyhold is shrouded in mystery, it clearly
has its roots in the customary law of individual manors and it clearly gained
halting legal recognition by the middle decades of the fifteenth century, as
Chancery began to provide some degree of protection for copyholders who had
become dispossessed of their estates. 118
It was in the sixteenth century, however, when copyhold would reach its full
vigor. By the close of the reign of King Henry VIII, Chancery had become the
copyholder's regular protector.119 Star Chamber and the Court of Requests also
played a significant role in protecting the copyholder.120 Beginning in the
1550s, the common-law courts began to extend protection to copyhold, and by
the Elizabethan period these courts had worked out a refined set of principles
to govern the affairs of copyholders. 121 Copyhold seemed poised to become a
useful and integral part of the English legal system.
3. The Triumph of the Gentry and the Domestication of Copyhold
Pace Tawney, copyhold as a legal institution seems to have peaked in the first
years of the seventeenth century.122 It was then when copyhold became the
subject of learned treatises by Charles Calthrope 123 and Sir Edward Coke,124
and the beneficiary of a sophisticated series of rules worked out by both the
common-law and the prerogative courts. 125 But decline was setting in even as
copyhold enjoyed its triumph.
118 0n the origin of copyhold in customary law, see GRAY, supra note 115, at 6-10; for
a discussion of the origins of the copyhold in customary law, see id. at 13. For a discussion
of the origin of Chancery protection for copyholders, cf. Alexander Savine, Copyhold
Cases in the Early Chancery Proceedings, 17 ENG. HIST. REV. 296 (1902) (reviewing
fifteenth-century Chancery cases regarding copyhold); Alexander Savine, English
Customary Tenure in the Tudor Period, 19 Q. J. ECON. 33 (1905) at 61-64 (providing further
analysis of the early Chancery cases).
119 See GRAY, supra note 115, at 34.
120See Leadam, supra note 116, at 684-696. Cf. I.S. Leadam, The Inquisition of 1517:
Incosures and Evictions, 6 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y 167 (new series, 1892)
(reviewing the status of copyhold in the courts in the opening decades of the sixteenth
century).
121See GRAY, supra note 115, at 54-146.
122 Thus Robert Allen writes: "The early seventeenth century marked the high point
of yeoman property rights. These rights, however, were not absolute and were not
sufficient to protect yeoman social structure. Large landowners continued to resist royal
efforts to protect peasants .... See ALLEN, supra note 106, at 77.
123 See CHARLES CALTHROPE, THE RELATION BETWEENETHE LORDOFA MANNOR ANDTHE
COPYHOLDER His TENANT (DeCapo Press 1972) (1635).
124 See COKE, supra note 116.
125 See supra notes 119-21, and accompanying text.
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The Statute of Tenures declared explicitly that copyhold was not to be
eliminated. 126 Even so, copyhold would never be restored to the position it had
occupied even at the time James I came to the throne.1 27 In part, the story of
this decline is a story of changing economic conditions. Copyholders were still
present in significant numbers at the Restoration, but after the mid-seventeenth
century, the status of copyholders and their security at law had ceased to be "a
live social issue."12
8
But along with changing economic conditions, one must also be cognizant
of the changed legal climate. The prerogative courts, which had provided
generous protection to copyholders of an earlier day, were eliminated. 129 But
126See 12 Car. II c. 24, sec. 7: 'Provided also, and be it further enacted That this Act,
or any Thing therein contained, shall not take away, or be construed to take away ...
nor to alter or change any Tenure by Copy of Court-Roll ......
127Concerning conditions early in the seventeenth century Alan MacFarlane states:
"About one-third of all English land was held by copyhold in the early seventeenth
century." See ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY,
PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL TRANSITION 83 (1978).
128 Christopher Clay, Landlords And Estate Management In England, in V AGRARIAN
HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, part II 198-99 (Joan Thirsk, ed., 1985). Christopher
Clay has given a sophisticated portrait of the situation copyholders faced in the
mid-seventeenth century:
In the England of the mid-seventeenth century customary tenures were
still widespread and important, although the proportion of the rural
population holding their land in this way was very much smaller than
it had been a hundred years earlier. In the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries, on manors all over the country, tenants who had
thought they enjoyed the protection of custom had discovered that
in law they were mere tenants-at-will. In some places, where the land
was especially valuable, they had been evicted and their holdings
enclosed and then relet as large farms at much higher rent. Perhaps
more commonly, after futile legal wrangling, they had been obliged
to accept the new situation. They continued to occupy their lands, but
as non-customary leaseholders they invariably had to pay more for
them. Even where tenures had been undeniably customary there had
been innumerable disputes between manorial lords and their tenants
about what exactly local custom prescribed, and in particular how
much the tenants could be made to pay for their tenancies. By the
middle of the seventeenth century, however, these controversies were
dying down, in part because few tenants remained whose customary
status could be challenged, and few manors where ambiguous customs
had not been spelt out one way or another. It was also in part because
the common law had clarified many formerly contentious issues.
. .. It may therefore be said of the period 1640-1750, that, except at the
very beginning of the it, neither the security of customary tenants nor
the extent of their financial obligations was a live social issue.
Id.
129Star Chamber was abolished by Act of Parliament in 1641. See 16 Car. I c. 10.
Blackstone stated that the Court of Requests was "virtually abolished" by the same Act
of Parliament that abolished Star Chamber. See ml WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, Bk. § 50 (quoted in HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 415). Holdsworth notes
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even more important than the elimination of this source of protection, was the
philosophy embodied in the Statute of Tenures. Although the Statute
purported to make room for copyholders, its logic was hostile to these small
customary landholders. The Act aimed at eradicating the efflorescence of
feudal tenures that had built up over five-hundred years of English legal
history, and declared that henceforth all tenures to be created by the king were
to be "in free and common socage."130 To be sure, copyhold was explicitly
exempted from the operation of this clause, but it was exempted only because
the Statute's drafters must have perceived this logic and sought to insulate
copyhold from it.
In any event, copyhold as a legal institution was doomed. Sir Roger North,
for instance, pursuing the logic of the Statute, called for the abolition of
copyhold. 13 1 A substantial case-law continued to build up around copyhold in
the eighteenth century, but this was a case-law largely divorced from English
realities.132 Holdsworth declared that copyhold had become by the eighteenth
century "a mischievous anachronism," and that "its recent history is mainly the
history of expedients for its extinguishment."133 Copyhold was finally
abolished in its entirety in the early part of the twentieth century.134
that the Act did not specifically declare Requests abolished, but that it ceased to meet
as a court after 1642, and that "after the Restoration, though Masters of Request were
appointed, they performed no judicial duties." Id. at 416.
13012 Car. IU c. 24, § 4.
131Sir Roger North used the premise of the Statute of Tenures--the abolition of the
royal tenancies in chief-to call for a similar abolition of copyhold: 'It was somewhat
unequal, when the Parliament took away the royal tenures in capite, that the lesser
tenures of the gentry were left exposed to as grievous abuses as the former." I SIR ROGER
NORTH, THE LIVES OF THE NORTHS 31 (Augustus Jessopp ed., 1890). Sir Roger argued as
well on what might be termed efficiency grounds that copyhold ought to be abolished
because it had simply become too expensive for the poorer sorts to pay the fees required
to retain it:
Small tenements and pieces of land that have been men's inheritances
for divers generations, to say nothing of the fines, are devoured by fees.
So that, if it were only to relieve the poorest of the land owners of the
nation from such extortions and oppressions without more, there is
reason enough to abolish the tenure.
Id.
132The case law surrounding copyhold is comprehensively reviewed in JOHN SCRIVEN,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYHOLDS (7th ed. 1896).
133HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at VII, 308.
134The chronology of copyhold's abolition is developed in ROBERT MEGARRY & H.W.R.
WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 34-6 (5th ed. 1984).
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C. Open Fields, Common Rights, and Parliamentary Enclosure
1. Enclosure and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century
A large portion of English farming, at the time Henry VIII ascended to the
throne, was performed by farmers working within an extraordinarily complex
system of open fields and common rights. This system, whose roots are
traceable back to the days of William the Conqueror, poses a whole series of
interesting questions for the legal historian-most of which, regrettably, have
gone generally unexplored.135
135The open-field system has been described as:
[a] system of cultivation with farmers allotted strips of land in the field
which could be re-allocated from time to time [that] was common
among freemen and sokemen at the time of the Norman Conquest,
especially in the Danelaw where serfdom was less common....
The system continued in full force after the Conquest for varying
periods in various localities. The strips represented roughly one acre
or a day's ploughing.... The general idea was to provide equal
treatment by scattering the allotments to each farmer among the
various fields of the manor or township.... The system worked well
for a time but became inconvenient and time-consuming and hardly
motivated improvements. Lords began to consolidate their demesnes
and the example was followed on the rest of the fields. Mediaeval
manorial extents show parts of a manor or village as open field but
with increasing enclosure as time went on. A survey of the West Field
of Cambridge in 1370 describes 1,000 parcels of land strip by strip.
Fitzherbert, in 1523, refers to the common practice of neighbouring
strip owners exchanging various strips so as to produce compact
holdings and enclosing these. In 1563, there are like accounts from
East Anglia.
Albert Kiralfy, The Humble Jumble: Legal Redress Under the Open-Field System, 10J. LEGAL
IST., 23 (1989).
Those who worked the land in this system had varying levels of legally cognizable
rights. Eric Kerridge has described the situation:
A common field is one in which various parts or parcels of land (or
the use of them) belong to individual proprietors, who exercise
sole proprietary rights when the land is in crop but leave them in
abeyance when it is not, so that when not in crop, the land is under
the general management of all the proprietors in common and by
common agreement. Thus a common field is alternately closed for
cropping and thrown open to all the commoners, that is, to all the
owners of common rights.... It goes without saying that common
fields, meadows, marshes, pastures, heaths, woods, and all commons
whatsoever are common only to the proprietors and to no one else.
ERIC KERRIDGE, THE COMMON FIELDSOF ENGLAND 1 (1992).
Kerridge has elsewhere added: "A common field was a tract of land subject to
common rights of pasture except when in crop and then necessarily fenced against stray
animals, kept several to the individual cultivators and debarred to all other commoners.
The essence of a common field was in these common rights." Id. at 5.
Historians have generally tended to ignore the legal issues posed by these
arrangements. As Kiralfy has observed: 'The enclosure movement has been very fully
examined by economic and social historians. However, they have tended to omit
consideration of legal details." Supra at 26.
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In the seventeenth century, this system of farming was targeted for
"improvement." In fact, the system was fundamentally transformed. From a
legal perspective, the peculiar engine of transformation, in the later part of the
seventeenth century and, even more, in the eighteenth century, became private
parliamentary decree. Our concern is with how it happened that Parliament
came to dominate these developments and with the nature of the
transformation thus worked.
If enclosure had been practised to at least some degree in England from
shortly after the year 1000, it nevertheless did not arouse great passion until
the end of the fifteenth century. Excitement was particularly aroused at that
time over rural depopulation. It was perceived that villages that had been
steadily inhabited for several hundred years were being emptied of their
people. The conclusion was quickly drawn that the enclosures of wealthier
landholders-especially those working to obtain large areas of contiguous
pastureland for sheep-grazing-were responsible.136
This novel phenomenon was denounced by the intellectual and religious
establishment of early Tudor England. Thomas More, for instance, in his Utopia,
described sheep that devour people and depopulate towns, connected
enclosure with the growth of poverty and idleness, and proposed that laws be
enacted to punish the wealthy and "greedy" landholders whose irresponsible
actions had brought these dire conditions to pass. 137 Hugh Latimer, a yeoman's
1361t seems that enclosure first came to the attention of Parliament in 1484, when "a
reference by the lord chancellor to enclosures and depopulation implied that the
government considered these matters urgent enough to call for action." Thirsk, supra
note 96, at 214. In 1491, the depopulation of the English countryside was denounced in
biblical terms by John Rous, who counted 58 villages as having been destroyed in the
County of Warwickshire alone. See Historia Regum Angliae (1491) (printed 1716, 2d ed.,
1745). This work is analyzed in BERESFORD, supra note 103, at 81-82.
137 Thomas More wrote:
Your sheep ... which are usually so tame and so cheaply fed,
begin now, according to report, to be so greedy and wild that they
devour human beings themselves and devastate and depopulate
fields, houses, and towns....
[11n order that one insatiable glutton and accursed plague of his
native land may join field to field and surround many thousand
acres with one fence, tenants are evicted. Some of them, either
circumvented by fraud or overwhelmed by violence, are stripped
even of their own property, or else, wearied by unjust acts, are
driven to sell. By hook or by crook the poor wretches are compelled
to leave their homes-men and women, husbands and wives,
orphans and widows, parents with little children and a household
not rich but numerous, since farming requires many hands....
[1In wandering from place to place, what remains for them but
to steal and be hanged-justly, you may say!--or to wander and
beg....
Thus, the unscrupulous greed of a few is ruining the very thing
by virtue of which your island was once counted fortunate in the
extreme....
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son himself, similarly declared in his inaugural sermon before King Edward
VI that the yeomanry was being destroyed by enclosures and that it was the
king's responsibility to stop the destruction. 138 Nor were the intellectuals and
religious leaders alone in their protests. Popular uprisings against enclosure
were also a part of the early Tudor scene. The Pilgrimage of Grace, for instance,
the 1536 challenge to Henry VIII's authority, had causes "not unconnected with
enclosure." 139 Throughout the sixteenth century, furthermore, peasants
enjoyed considerable success bringing actions against enclosers in the royal
courts. 140
The political response to this sense of outrage and resistance remained for
much of the sixteenth century openly sympathetic to the opponents of
enclosure. The first statute that attempted to limit the practice of enclosure was
enacted in 1487 but addressed only conditions on the Isle of Wight. 141 A statute
directed "agaynst pylling doun of tounes" and meant to apply to the whole of
England was enacted the next year.142 Yet another measure was enacted on a
temporary basis in 1515 and made permanent in 1516. This Act was directed
against the conversion of arable land to pasture, and ordered that all enclosures
Cast out these ruinous plagues. Make laws that the destroyers
of farmsteads and country villages should either restore them or
hand them over to people who will restore them and who are ready
to build. Restrict this right of rich individuals to buy up everything
and this licence to exercise a kind of monopoly for themselves."
THOMAS MORE, in IV UTOPIA (THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE) 65-71 (1963).
13 8See Elizabeth T. Hastings, A Sixteenth-Century Manuscript Translation of Latimer's
First Sermon Before Edward, 60 PUB. MOD. LANGUAGE Ass'N OF AM. 959 (1945). Latimer
declared:
But let the preacher preach til his tong be worne to the stompes,
nothing is amended. We have good statutes made for the commen-
welth as touching comeners, enclosers, many metings and Sessions,
but in the end of the matter their commeth nothing forth....
For if ye bryng it to passe, that the yomanry be not able to put
their sonnes to schole (as in dede universities do wonderously
decaye all redy) and that they be not able to mary their daughters
to the avoidyng of whoredome, I say ye plucke salvation from the
people and utterly distroy the realm.
For by yomans sonnes, the fayth of Christ is, and hath bene
mayntained chefely. Is this realme taught by rich mens sonnes?
No, no .. .
Id. at 989.
13 9Thirsk, supra note 96, at 219.
140SeeJOAN THIRSK, TUDOR ENCLOSURES 6 (2d ed. 1989) ("[tlhe many... enclosure cases
heard in the courts at Westminster combine to portray a far from docile peasantry,
invoking 'ancient custom' to good effect").
141See 4 Hen. VII c. 16 (1487); cf. Thirsk, supra note 96, at 214 (analyzing the contents
of this statute).
1424 Hen. VII c. 19; cf. Thirsk, supra 96, at 214 (analyzing this statute); BERESFORD, supra
note 103, at 103-105 (quoting from this statute and further analyzing it).
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to have taken place after February, 1515, were to be restored to their formerly
arable state "after the maner and usage of the countrey where the seid lond
lyeth."143 The penalty for noncompliance was "the forfeiture of half the profits
from the holding to the lord of the fee so long as offence continued."144
Nor was the political establishment content with simply declaring enclosure
in violation of the laws of England. Cardinal Wolsey, then the lord chancellor
of England, resolved that the laws against enclosure should be strictly enforced.
Two years later [in 1517] Wolsey appointed a commission of enquiry
into depopulation - a more effective instrument for measuring the
scale of the problem than any used hitherto. It reflected the importance
attached to the subject by the government .... The commissioners
were ordered to conduct investigations in all but the four northern
counties of England, to report on villages and houses pulled down
since 1488, the amount of land then in tillage and now in pasture, and
the amount of parkland enclosed for the preservation of wild animals.
In 1518, when the commission was still conducting enquiries, the first
offenders began to appear in Chancery, and in a decree of the court
issued that year it was ordered that all who pleaded for pardon should,
within forty days, pull down all enclosures made since 1485, unless
they could prove that their enclosures were beneficial to the
commonwealth....
Prosecutions by the Crown in the court of Chancery and in the court
of King's Bench continued for the next twenty years.
Indeed, opposition to enclosure remained a standard part of the English
political scene for most of the rest of the sixteenth century. Statutes attacking
and outlawing a variety of innovations were enacted throughout the Tudor
period, and the creation of commissions dedicated to the extirpation of the new
agricultural practices remained important.146 This situation, however, would
change dramatically as the forces of revolution gathered strength in the early
years of the seventeenth century.
143 7 Hen. VIII c. 1, Statutes of the Realm m, 176-177; cf. Thirsk, supra note 96, at 215
(analyzing the statutory language). Other provisions of the Act required that "villages
and habitation which on the first day of the present Parliament were 'for the more part'
occupied in tillage were to continue so," and that "all buildings that were decayed were
to be rebuilt within a year." Id. at 215.
14 4Thirsk, supra note 96, at 216. The drafters of the Act worked on the assumption that
where "the overlord was not zealous in the cause of the commonwealth then the next
superior lord could seize." BERESFORD, supra note 103, at 106.
145 Thirsk, supra note 96, at 216; cf. I.S. LEADAM, THE DOMESDAY OF INCLOSURES,
1517-1518 (1897) (collecting and analyzing the findings of the commission against
enclosures).
146See id. at 216-232.
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2. The Seventeeth-Century Triumph of the Enclosure Movement
In 1601, the question was raised in Parliament whether to repeal some of the
enclosure legislation of the previous century. Sir Walter Raleigh led the effort,
raising a series of arguments against the desirability of prohibiting enclosures:
enclosure laws did not work, Raleigh charged, because the poor, whom the
laws aimed to protect, could not afford to work the land even if their access to
it was legally guaranteed. Furthermore, enclosure laws were not needed for the
national welfare because foreign trade may produce as much grain as England
needs. Raleigh closed by declaring that freedom-which was every
Englishman's desire-was infringed by prohibitions on enclosure.14 7
In 1607, in response to a peasant uprising in the Midlands counties, the
government established a commission to see to the enforcement of the
anti-enclosure laws. This commission would prove to be "the last large-scale
enquiry" into the enforcement of these laws. 148 Indeed, opinion in government
circles had already begun to shift in favor of a prudent accommodation of
enclosure. A memorandum prepared for the Privy Council in July, 1607, for
instance, at the time of the Midlands uprising, proposed the need to strike a
balance between the requirement "that the poor man shall be satisfied in his
end, habitation, and the gentleman not hindered in his desire,
improvement."149
1 4 7 See SIR SIMONDS D'EwEs, A COMPLEAT JOURNAL OF THE VOTES, SPEECHES, AND
DEBATES BOTH OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS (1693). Sir Simonds
D'Ewes records Raleigh as stating:
I think this Law fit to be repealed, for many poor men are not able to
find seed to sow so much as they are bound to plough, which they
must do or incur the Penalty of the Law. Besides, all Nations abound
with Com. France offered to serve Ireland with Com for sixteen shillings
a quarter, which is but two shillings the bushel; if we should sell it so
here, the Ploughman would be beggared. The Low-Country man and
the Hollander, which never soweth Corn, hath by his industry such
plenty that they will serve other Nations .... And therefore I think the
best course is to set it at liberty, and leave every man free, which is the
desire of a true English man.
Id. at 674.
Raleigh is recorded as expressing similar preferences for economic freedom
elsewhere: 'I do not like the constraining of them to use their Grounds at our wills but
rather let every man use his Ground to that which it is most fit for, and therein use his
own Discretion." Quoted in Maurice Beresford, Habitation Versus Improvement: The Debate
on Enclosure By Agreement, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF TUDOR
AND STUART ENcLAND. IN HONOUR OF R.H. TAWNEY 40,44-5 (F.J. Fisher, ed., 1961).
148Thirsk, supra note 96, at 236.
1 4 9 A CONSIDERATION OF THE CAUSE IN QUESTION BEFORE THE LORDS TOUCHING
DEPOPULATION (1607) quoted in Thirsk, supra note 96, at 236.
Traditional notions of customary rights also came under attack in Gateward's Case,
77Eng.Rep. 344 (1607). Robert Smith, who asserted thathehad bycustom "estcommorans
et inhabitans... in an ancient house" for some time and continued to do so, brought an
action in trespass quare clausumfregit against Stephen Gateward, for intruding on his
dwelling. According to Coke, the Court of Common Pleas declared:
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The rhetoric of improvement soon came not only to challenge but actually
displace the older anti-enclosure sentiments. The changing climate of opinion
is mirrored in good measure in the proposal John Shotbolt advanced in his
essay entitled Verie necessary considerations for the Weale Publique.15° Shotbolt
argued that, properly pursued, a policy of enclosure would benefit the entire
realm.151 Depopulation might be avoided and the "Weale Publique"
advanced. 152 In 1623, Adam Moore, in his Bread for the Poor, made similar
arguments. 153 Gabriel Plattes, whose Discovery of Infinite Treasure was
published in 1639, echoed his predecessors in claiming that enclosure in fact
increased national wealth and so improved the lot of the poor.154 The
There are but four manner of commons, sc., common appendant,
appurtenant, in gross, and by reason of vicinage, and this common
ratione commorant et resident is none of them .... What estate shall he
have who is resident in the common, when it appears he hath no
estate or interest in the house (but a mere habitation and dwelling),
in respect of which he ought to have his common? For none can have
interest in common in respect of a house in which he hath no interest.
Such common will be transitory, and altogether uncertain, for it will
follow the person, and for no certain time or estate, but during his
inhabitancy, and such manner and interest the law will not suffer, for
custom ought to extend to that which hath certainty and continuance.
77 Eng.Rep. at 344-345.
E.P. Thompson sees within Gateward's Case and its progeny "the ulterior rationality
of capitalist definitions of property rights." E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 133
(1991). Less dramatically and less dogmatically, another commentator has recently
noted that "the chief policy concern" of the Court in Gateward's Case "was that
landowners be able to enclose." The Court achieved this result by emphasizing that it
would enforce only customs that were certain. See Note: Persistence of the Ancient Regime:
Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183,
191 (1993).
15OBeresford indicates that this work is undated, but it may date from the late 1610s
or early 1620s. See Beresford, supra note 147, at 54.
151Shotbolt argued:
The vulgar or common sorte of people.. .might nowe bee persuaded
and make a generall Triall of the contrary course, that is freely and
willingly to assent to a speedy and generall Inclosure in all partes of
the Kingdome and bee humble Suitors to his Majestie not onely to
yeild his Royall assent thereunto or to tollerate the same but rather
to endeavour by all means possible to sett so good a business in
hand for soe generall Inriching to all sortes and every particular.Quoted in id. at 54.
152Summarizing Shotbolt's argument, Beresford states: "For him, enclosure was not
the first step toward a change in land use, but a means to more efficient arable
production." Id. at 54.
153See ADAM MOORE, BREAD FOR THE POOR (1623). Cf. Beresford, supra note 147, at 54.
1 5 4 See GABRIEL PLATIES, A DISCOVERY OF INFINITE TREASURE HIDDEN SINCE THE
WORLD'S BEGINNING (1639); cf. W.E. TATE, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMMUNITY AND THE
ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT 76 (1967) (analyzing Plattes's arguments). Tate provides other
examples of mid-seventeenth century opinion shifting in favor of the enclosers. Thus in
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pro-enclosure arguments were part of a national debate that endured through
the 1650s.155 The debate was assisted in part by the changing nature of
enclosure: While enclosure in the sixteenth century meant the fencing off of
land to accommodate sheep-farming, the new enclosure practices entailed the
adoption of agricultural techniques that had the effect of greatly increasing the
food supply.156 Arguments based on improvement carried greater resonance
when large numbers of people were benefited.
The debate, however, was short-lived and one-sided. With the Restoration
of Charles II in 1660, it was no longer possible, according to W.E. Tate, even to
make the anti-enclosure argument: "From about this time onwards [1660]
writers.., in general no longer argue the pros and cons of enclosure, or for that
matter of engrossing, or of converting the peasant proprietor into a
wage-earning labourer. All three alike are in general taken for granted."'157
The new intellectual respectability achieved by the pro-enclosure forces
came to be felt in the political arena as early as the 1610s and 1620s. By this time,
Parliament had come to view its own anti-enclosure legislation with increasing
scepticism. "In 1618, the government decided that 'tillage is become much more
frequent and usual, corn is at reasonable rates,' and appointed a commission
of judges and others in order that 'the rigor of the statutes may be mitigated
according to these present times and occasions.' 158 In 1624, Parliament opened
debate on whether the anti-enclosure legislation of the preceding century
should be repealed. Sir Edward Coke denounced the old legislation as "so like
labyrinths, with such intricate windings or turnings as little or no fruit proceed-
1649, Walter Blith argued in his ENGLISH IMPROVER that the poor were better off
under enclosure: "'The open field farmers are in dire poverty, and would be better off
in Bridewell."' Quoted in TATE, supra at 77.
In 1651, Samuel Hartlib published his LEGACIE, which raised the question: "Whether
Commons [common fields] do not rather make poore, by causing idleness than
maintaine them: and such poore who are trained up rather for the Gallowes or begarry
than for the Commonwealth's service." Quoted in id. at 51.
155 A play by Philip Massinger, staged in the early 1630s, presented the character of
Sir Giles Overreach, a notorious encloser:
Extortioner, tyrant, cormorant, or intruder On my poor neighbour's
right or grand incloser Of what was common to my private uses;...
Philip Massinger, A New Way To Pay Old Debts (1633) quoted in W.E. TATE, supra note
154, at 75).
156 0n the development of new farming techniques, see ERIc KERRIDGE, THE FARMERS
OF OLD ENGLAND 103-136 (1973).
157 TATE, supra note 154, at 78-79. Tate notes, however, that agricultural writers in
particular continued to advocate enclosure through the 1660s and 1670s: "Almost
without exception . . . agricultural writers of the day either take for granted the
desirability of enclosure or strongly recommend it." Id. at 82.
158Thirsk, supra note 96, at 236.
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ed from them."159 In the event, Parliament was successful in obtaining a partial
repeal of the old enclosure legislation. 160
As with wardship, opposition to the anti-enclosure legislation came to a
head during Charles I's personal rule. A new enquiry into enclosures and
depopulations was organized in 1630, ostensibly to enforce the remaining
anti-enclosure laws, but the real purpose was to exploit one more source of
revenue to finance Charles's effort to govern without convening Parliament.
Beresford has called the operation of this commission "a familiar mixture of
paternalism and pick-pocketry."161 A number of prosecutions were brought in
Star Chamber, although a number of landowners were able to avoid
prosecution by the payment of fines.162 But the landowners would have their
revenge. In 1644, after the parliamentarians had seized power, Archbishop
Laud, one of Charles's most prominent supporters, was tried for treason.
Among the charges preferred against him was the allegation that "he did a little
too much countenance the commission for depopulations." 163 Laud was found
guilty of this and other offenses and publicly beheaded in January, 1645.
3. Parliamentary Enclosures
The first half of the seventeenth century not only witnessed the emergence
of powerful new intellectual defenses of enclosures; it also witnessed-as
might be guessed from what has already been reviewed-renewed efforts to
make enclosure a living social reality. These efforts are first noticeable, early in
the century, in the private agreements landowners had begun to reach with the
holders of common rights to enclose commons and extinguish group rights of
access. In this way, it was hoped, the anti-enclosure legislation on the books
might be avoided.
By the 1620s and 1630s, Chancery approval was often sought for these
agreements. The affected parties would enter a collusive agreement, and then
summon a judge to hear the matter. Those enjoying common rights would
present documentation purporting to establish an agreement to exchange their
rights with some encloser on receipt of certain consideration but then allege
the lord was obstructing the fulfillment of the contract. The lord would then
judicially acknowledge the agreement, and the Chancery judges would duly
record the fact of the enclosure. 164
159Quoted in Thirsk, supra note 96, at 236. Elsewhere Coke declared that anti-enclosure
laws were "unnecessary statutes unfit for this time... snares that might have lien heavy
upon the subject." Third Part of the Institutes, quoted in Beresford, supra note 144, at 49.
160Thirsk, supra note 96, at 236.
16 1 See Beresford, supra note 144, at 50.
162 The operation of this commission, and the prosecutions brought in Star Chamber
are rigorously detailed in SHARPE, supra note 16, at 471-473.
163Quoted in Thirsk, supra note 96, at 237.
16 4The methods employed in reaching these agreements are reviewed in TATE, supra
note 154, at 47. Cf. E.M. Leonard, The Inclosure of Common Fields in the Seventeenth Century,
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Parliamentary approval of such agreements, however, was a much rarer
phenomenon. Two parliamentary decrees approving private enclosure
agreements dating to the early seventeenth century are extant.165 These
agreements, however, seem to be anomalous.
By contrast, by the time one reaches the middle decades of the eighteenth
century, parliamentary enclosure had become routine. A standard procedure
had been developed, and private acts to enclose proliferated. 166 It has been
estimated that"[a]fter 1760 altogether there were about 5,400 enclosure acts and
enclosures under general acts, covering ... more than seven million acres-say
a fifth of the area of England."167 It was this proliferation that was denounced
by Karl Marx: "The law itself becomes the instrument of theft of the people's
land.... The Parliamentary form of robbery is that of Acts for enclosures of
Commons, in other words, decrees by which the landlords grant themselves
the people's land as private property, decrees of expropriation of the people."168
The gap between 1604 and 1760 is a large one, and-if one follows the
standard chronology-any role for the English Revolution would seem to be
thereby excluded. This view, however, has been challenged by W.E. Tate, who
has seen the period between 1660 and 1690 as crucial to the development of
"Georgian era" enclosure, by which he means eighteenth-century
parliamentary enclosure:
For our purpose [the study of the history of enclosure] we may
consider the 'Georgian' era [the eighteenth century after the 1714
accession to the throne of King George I] as beginning not in 1714 when
the Elector became King. The operative date is rather, perhaps, 1660,
when the impoverished squires returned from the Continent... or
perhaps better still 1688/9, when their sons established the
parliamentary monarchy.
169
Tate documents this assertion by pointing to the increasing standardization
of parliamentary enclosure decrees found in the latter half of the seventeenth
19 TRANSACTIONS ROYALHIST. Soc'y 101,108-113 (new series, 1905) (providing examples
of judicially approved enclosure chiefly from the 1630s).
16 5See TATE, supra note 154, at 50. The agreements are for Radipole in Dorset (1603)
and Marden in Herefordshire (1606). Id.
166 0n the procedure utilized, see Frank A. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure
Acts, 10 J. LEGAL HIST. 45 (1989).
16 7TATE, supra note 154, at 50-51. These acts are comprehensively listed and analyzed
by W.E. TATE, A DOMESDAY OF ENGLISH ENCLOSURE ACTS AND AWARDS (1978). Cf.
BARBARA ENGLISH, ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY ENCLOSURE: ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
AND ECONOMIC HISTORY (1980) (reviewing the practice of parliamentary enclosure with
special reference to the period between 1730 and 1870).
168 KARL MARX DAS KAPITAL quoted in MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (Maureen Cain and
Alan Hunt trans., 1979). Cf. Sharman, supra note 166, at 45 (discussing Marx's view of
enclosure).
169 TATE, supra note 154, at 80.
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century, and to the steady growth in the number of such decrees.170 The new
advocates of parliamentary enclosure justified their actions by appeal not only
to the doctrine of improvement as expressed in the economic literature of the
preceding fifty years, but also to the results of experiments conducted in the
fledgling field of agronomy.171
Thus were common rights and common fields on their way to becoming
things of the past. These traditional arrangements had fallen into disfavor. They
were no longer defended by lawyers and politicians, and indeed had been
denounced by those who sought to "improve" England's condition.
Improvement in turn meant reliance on the new, scientifically validated means
of production and was justified by recourse to arguments based on efficiency
or on economic liberty. The poor themselves would be helped--so it was
claimed-by the overall increase in the standard of living that would result
from the eradication of the old order and the adoption of new approaches.
IV. FREE ALIENABILITY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, AND THE
ADOPTION OF THE STRICT SETTLEMENT
We are engaged in analyzing the revolutionary transformation of the English
land law in the middle and later decades of the seventeenth century. So far we
have examined the abolition of the feudal tenures, the adoption of socage
tenure as the main form of holding land, and the impact of the enclosure
movement on older patterns of agriculture and landholding. But these were
not the only revolutionary changes. The lawyers of the years 1640-1700 were
also forced to reach a new understanding of the principle of the free alienability
of land and the proper limits to place on this principle.
It has been often, but wrongly, asserted that the seventeenth century in
England witnessed the unequivocal triumph of the principle of the free
alienability of land. It is more appropriate, however, to see the period as giving
rise to a set of enduring compromises between two competing impulses: The
need to maintain a market in land satisfactory to meet rising levels of demand,
170The early acts are listed in TATE, supra note 154, at 50. The first parliamentary
enclosure after 1606 occurred in 1664 and the next in 1668. The pace steadily increases
as the end of the seventeenth century approached. See id. The importance of the late
seventeenth century to the parliamentary enclosure movement is further analyzed at
id., 80-82.
1711d. at 80-81. One such discovery was the new awareness that turnips might be
planted as a feed crop for sheep and cattle on enclosed lands, thus greatly increasing
the yield. Id. at 80-81.
Two books that helped to shape the late seventeenth century debate were Samuel
Fortrey's ENGLAND'S INTEREST AND IMPROVEMENT published in 1663 and Andrew
Yarranton's ENGLANES IMPROVEMENT BY LAND AND SEA published in 1677 and
republished 1681. These works and others like them emphasized economic growth and
continual "improvement" as the means to achieve national supremacy. As Yarranton
wrote concerning the necessity of adopting enclosure: "[B]y adopting enclosure we
could] outdo the Dutch without fighting, pay debts without money, and set at work all
the poor of England." Quoted in TATE, supra note 154, at 81).
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on the one hand, and the desire of the gentry, on the other, to conserve their
landholdings and pass them down intact to the next generation. The creation
of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the strict settlement must be understood
against the backdrop of these conflicting desires. Both of these institutions had
the effect of constricting the free alienability of land in order to meet the
dynastic requirements of the gentry, and together they represent the striking of
a complicated and delicate balance between the desirability of free alienability
and the imperative that landed estates and family property be preserved. The
struggle over how this balance was struck is explored below.
A. The Free Alienability of Land, The "Necessities of Commerce," and the Rule
"Against" Perpetuities
1. The Debate Over the Free Alienability of Land
Marxist historiography, represented classically in a work like C.B.
MacPherson's Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, has maintained that
seventeenth century England witnessed the emergence of a new and unfettered
market in land. Indeed, MacPherson argues that during the seventeenth
century England became a "possessive market society" that recognized, inter
alia, that "land and resources are owned by individuals and are alienable."172
Elaborating on this point, MacPherson continues: "Labour, land, and capital,
as well as products, become subject [in the mid-seventeenth century] to the
determination of the market.' 173 These developments, MacPherson argued,
represented a decisive break with the customary and status-based society of
the preceding centuries, which stressed the authoritative allocation of
productive work and which lacked "markets in land and labour.' 174 Thus, in
MacPherson's view, the traditional restraints on the formation of a market in
land were dissolving, and a new free market was being born.
The reality, of course, is a good deal more complicated than MacPherson's
simple schema suggests. Indeed, debate can be found over the proper limits on
the free alienability of land as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In
this early period, it was unclear whether the tenant holding a fee simple could
alienate it without permission of his lord. Indeed, the fee simple itself was only
then coming into existence, and only gradually did it acquire the characteristics
we associate with it: indefiniteness of duration, inheritability, and
alienability.175 Only gradually was it recognized that a fee simple might be
17 2 See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POUTICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE 54 (1962).
173 1d.
1741d. at 49.
175See Percy Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities 1, 22 IOWA L. REV. 437, 445 (1937).
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alienated by the tenant even where the grantor had not specifically so provided
in the grant.176
The statute Quia Emptores (1290) represents a significant landmark in the
development of a notion of free alienability. The problem that confronted the
drafters of Quia Emptores was the issue of subinfeudation and might best be
illustrated by a hypothetical: Suppose A held a manor of the Duke of York,
who in turn held of the king in knight's service. Suupose further that A wished
to alienate a portion of this manor to B. B would hold his estate of Aand would
owe his feudal incidents to A, not to the Duke of York or to the King. The
difficulty confronting the Duke of York or the king in these circumstances was
that their receipt of feudal dues depended upon the performance of increasing
numbers of sub-tenants occupying situations similar to B's.177
Quia Emptores changed this situation fundamentally.178 As Sir Frederick
Pollock has put it:
It was enacted that every freeman might thenceforth dispose at will
of his tenement, or any part thereof, but so that the taker should hold
it from the same chief lord, and by the same services. The incomer
became the direct tenant of the chief lord, and liable to him, and to him
only, for a proportionate part of the services due in respect of the
original holding.
1 79
It has been asserted that Quia Emptores "established [the] principle of the free
alienation of land."180 While Quia Emptores was intended to strengthen the
176This development is traced in SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 85.
177Sir Frederick Pollock explains the situation:
Before 1290 the feudal tenant who alienated the whole of his land
put the new tenant in his place as regards the lord; but if he alienated
a part only, the effect was to create a new and distinct tenure by
subinfeudation, as it is called. Thus, if the king granted a manor to
Bigod, and Bigod granted a part of it to Pateshull, Bigod was tenant
as regards the king, and lord as regards Pateshull. Bigod remained
answerable to the king for the services and dues to be rendered in
respect of the whole manor, and Pateshull to Bigod in respect of the
portion Bigod had granted him. Pateshull, again, might grant over
to Raleigh a portion of what he had from Bigod, and as to that portion
would be Raleigh's lord, and Raleigh would be his tenant.... These
under-tenures were constantly multiplying, and not only titles became
complicated, but the interests of superior lords were gravely affected.
The lord's right to the services of his tenant were in themselves un-
changed by any subinfeudation; but his chance of getting them practi-
cally depended on the punctuality of the under-tenants, against whom
he had no personal rights, in rendering their contribution to the
immediate tenant.
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAws 70-71 (3d ed., 1896).
17818 Edward I c.1 (1290).
179 PoLLocK, supra note 177, at 71.
180JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PRoPERTY 153 (2d ed. 1988).
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position of the great feudal lords and to put an end to subinfeudation it
"actually marked the beginning of the end" of the whole system.181 Free tenants
could henceforth "substitute a new tenant for all or part of their land without
[their] lord's consent."182
But despite the establishment of the principle of free alienability of land,
important questions remained open: Granted that a tenant in fee simple might
freely alienate his land, might he nevertheless prohibit future tenants from
doing the same? If he did possess this power, then what were its limits?183
These two questions would have been answered in the opening decades of
the fifteenth century by reference to a statute nearly contemporaneous with
Quia Emptores-the Statute De Donis, enacted in 1285.184 This statute created a
category of estate known as the fee tail, which worked as follows: A party
holding a fee simple interest would grant an interest, called a fee tail, to some
other party. The holder of the fee tail might possess it for life and pass it on to
his heirs, but he was forbidden from alienating it outside his lineal descendants.
When the line eventually failed, the estate reverted to a specified reversioner
or his heirs. Under the terms of the statute De Donis, furthermore, the fee tail
so created was unbarrable; that is, it could not be broken by the party enjoying
possession. This sort of arrangement had a not surprising impact on the market
for such land.185 George Haskins has explained:
Increasingly, during [the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries] the
problem became the practical one of marketability: a grantee might
take land in good faith believing it to be freely alienable as the
equivalent of a fee simple only to discover subsequently that the land
had been entailed several generations back, that the lineal descendants
of a prior grantee had died out, and that now a valid claim might be
asserted by the heirs of the reversioner or remainderman under the
original grant. Apparently, so much of the land in England had been
tied up in entails of this sort that it became unsafe to take a conveyance
lest one lose it in the manner described.
186
1811d. at 152.
18 21d. at 153.
183These were important questions from the perspective of England's wealthy
families. Dukeminier and Krier have framed the problem thus:
One of the great and continuing conflicts in the development of English
property law arose out of the desire of the heads of rich families to make
land inalienable. In a real sense, land was family power, status, and wealth,
and those who controlled it wanted to make it impossible-or, if not
impossible, at least very difficult-for their descendants to alienate it.
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 180, at 163.
184See Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, c. 1.
185See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 28 (explaining the operation of the
fee tail as created by the Statute De Donis).
1861d. at 28.
[Vol. 43:221
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/4
17TH CENTURY ENGLISH LAND LAW
King's Bench, in Taltarum's Case (1472),187 fundamentally altered the
operation of the unbarrable fee tail. The Court recognized that a party holding
a fee tail interest could suffer a "common recovery" which would have the effect
of breaking the entail and transforming the fee tail interest into a fee simple
one.188 It remained possible, even after Taltarum's Case, to place restrictions on
the future alienability of land which might be enforced by equity, but at least
at common law the effect of this case was to promote free alienability.189
Henceforth Taltarum's Case gave those holding restricted fee tail estates the
choice to suffer a common recovery thereby converting their interest to a fee
simple. Dynastic arrangements that relied on the fee tail for their security were
no longer secure.
18 7y.B. 12 Edw. 4, 19A. For background to Taltarum's Case, see Percy Bordwell,
Alienability and Perpetuities II, 24 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51-56 (1938); Frederic W. Maitland,
Note on Taltarum's Case, 9 LAw Q. REV. 1 (1893); Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note
6, at 28-29.
188 Casner and Leach have called the decision in Taltarum's Case "an all-time high in
legalistic hocus-pocus." See A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY 256 (1969). Casner and Leach describe the common recovery as "a collusive
law suit," and explain the operation of this device in the following terms:
The rule of law which made disentailment possible proceeded in two
steps: (a) it was first held that a tenant in tail could convey a fee
simple provided that he substituted lands of equal value for those
conveyed; (b) it was next held that a judgment for the recovery of
lands of equal value could be substituted for the entailed lands.
With such a rule, plus a complacent blindness of the goddess Justice,
the rest was easy. Suppose A, tenant in tail of Blackacre, wanted to
convey a fee simple to B. B brought a writ of right (the highest form
of real action) against A, claiming title to Blackacre, and demanding
that a judgment be awarded that he recover the same. A in his answer
alleged (falsely) that he had acquired title from C and that C had
warranted the title, wherefore he 'vouched C to warranty,' i.e. called
upon him to defend the title to Blackacre and demanded that if C
should fail in the defense of the title, A should be given judgment to
recover from C lands equal in value to Blackacre. C admitted (falsely)
that he had warranted as A alleged. Then C allowed judgment to go
in favor of B by default. Under the judgment B recovered Blackacre
from A, and A was given a judgment against C to recover lands of
the same value as Blackacre. The catch, of course, was that C was
carefully chosen as a person who owned no lands at all; so the
judgment against him was worthless. (C was usually the court
crier and was known as the 'common vouchee'--whence the judg-
ment was called a common recovery).
Of course, after B got the fee simple, he could convey it directly
back to A; thus, more frequently than not, B as well as C was a 'straw
man' who was brought into the picture merely to turn A's fee tail into
a fee simple.
Id. at 256-57, n. 13.
189See infra notes 190-225 and accompanying text (discussing equitable limitations on
free alienability).
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2. Early Seventeenth-Century case law limitations on free alienability
Chudleigh's Case, known in Coke's Reports as the Case of Perpetuities,
decided in 1595, represented the substantial accommodation the Elizabeth Age
continued to extend to the principle of free alienability.190 In his argument in
Chudleigh's Case, Sir Francis Bacon spoke for the spirit of the age when he
repeatedly condemned "perpetuities. 191 When Bacon used the term
"perpetuity" in this pejorative sense, he had in mind unbarrable entails and
perpetual freeholds. 19 2 Speaking generally, one might safely understand
Bacon's argument to reflect the sort of commitment to free alienability found
in Taltarum's Case. Efforts by a tenant to perpetuate his estate through devices
that created unbreakable life estates in successive heirs, in Bacon's estimation,
must not receive the support of the law.193
Thus "[bly the early seventeenth century the struggle for free alienability had
met with considerable success."194 But this broad accommodation of free
alienability was being rendered insecure at the very time it seemed triumphant.
Two cases in particular are important for the doubt they cast on the scope of
free alienability. The case of Pells v. Brown (1620)195 involved litigation over a
disposition made by a certain farmer, William Brown, Sr., for his two sons,
William, Jr., and Thomas. The disposition gave the farm to Thomas, the
younger son, but also provided that in the event Thomas died without issue
190 The report of Chudleigh's Case is found at 1 Co. Rep. 113b (1589-1595), 76 Eng. Rep.
261. Chudleigh's Case was the ultimate judicial response to the efforts of conveyancers to
use the Statute of Uses to create the sort of arrangements that Taltarum's Case had
rendered insecure. See infra notes 191-94 and 275-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the relationship of Chudleigh's Case to the Statute of Uses).
1911t seems that Bacon is the first English lawyer to have used the term "perpetuity."
See VII THE WORKSOF FRANcIs BACON 623-36 (James Spedding ed., 1872) (in which Bacon
uses the term "perpetuity" repeatedly). Cf. Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities, supra
note 175 at 437-438 (analyzing Bacon's use of the term "perpetuity"). Bacon's argument
in Chudleigh's Case is thoroughly reviewed in DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON
128-136 (1992).
192 See BACON, supra note 191, at 623-36 (criticizing unbarrable entails and perpetual
freeholds); cf. Bordwell, supra note 175, at 437-438 (analyzing Bacon's attack on these
practices).
193 See Bordwell, supra note 175, at 438; see also COQUILLETTE, supra note 191, at 134.
The Elizabethan opposition to perpetuities, understood as perpetual restraints on the
alienation of land, is also reflected in contemporary legislation. See William S.
Holdsworth, An Elizabethan Bill Against Perpetuities, 35 LAw Q. REV. 258 (1919)
(analyzing late sixteenth-century legislative efforts to restrict further the use of
perpetuities). The judges in Chudleigh's Case cloaked their opposition to perpetuities in
theological garb. 'erpetuities," the Court declared, "do befight against God." Quoted in
John S. Grimes, Runnymeade Revisited, 6 VAL. L. REV. 135, 136 (1972).
194 See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 31.
19 5Cro. Jac. 592, 79 Eng. Rep. 590.
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during William Jr.'s lifetime, the farm should go to William.196 Once in
possession of the estate Thomas, acting under the belief that he enjoyed a fee
tail interest, suffered a common recovery in order to convert his estate to a fee
simple and then proceeded to alienate the estate to the Pells family.197 Thomas
died without issue during William Jr.'s lifetime, and William brought an action
to invalidate the transfer of the estate to the Pells. 198
The Court held in favor of William Jr., declaring first that Thomas was
mistaken in his belief that he possessed a fee tail. Rather, Thomas had "a fee
simple subject to an executory interest because the failure of Thomas's issue
was to be determined at a specific point in time, namely during William Jr.'s
life."199 The Court then proceeded to announce flatly that a fee simple interest
of this sort was indestructible and that this had always been so.200
John Grimes has claimed that the Court's decision in Pells v. Brown amounted
to a "new Runnymeade."201 George Haskins has termed the outcome "truly
revolutionary. 202 Less flamboyantly, John Chipman Gray has opined that "the
Rule against Perpetuities had to be invented to control the indestructible future
interest created by Pells v. Brown .... ,203 For our purposes, Pells v. Brown is
important because it represented an early attempt to accommodate the
principle of free alienability with the ascendant gentry's desire to preserve the
integrity of their estates.
Manning's Case, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1609, was the
second case to put into doubt the scope of the principle of free alienability.204
Haskins has described the state of the law prior to 1609:
19 6 See Cro. Jac. 590-591,79 Eng. Rep. 504-505; cf. Haskins, supra note 6, at 32 (reviewing
the statement of facts).
197Cro.Jac. 591-592,79 Eng. Rep. at 504-505; cf. Haskins, supra note 6, at 32 (reviewing
the statement of facts).
19 8Cro. Jac. 590-591, 79 Eng. Rep. 504-505; cf. Haskins, supra note 6, at 32 (reviewing
the statement of facts)
19 9See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 33.
20 0The Court held that the estate could not be good by remainder, but "by way of
contingency, and by way of executory devise to another, to determine the one estate,
and limit it to another, upon an act to be performed or in failure of performance thereof,
etc., for the one may be and hath always been allowed .... Cro. Jac. at 592, 79 Eng.
Rep. at 505-506.
Doderidge, at least, did not think that this was always the rule. He dissented,
asserting: "[William] had but the possibility to have a fee, and quasi a contingent estate,
which is destroyed by this recovery before it came in esse: for otherwise it would be a
mischievous kind of perpetuity which could not by any means be destroyed." Cro. Jac.
at 592, 79 Eng. Rep. at 506.
20ISee Grimes, supra note 193, at 140.
202 Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 33.
203JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 122 (4th ed. 1942).
2048 Co. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (1609).
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Before Manning's Case was decided the owner of a term of years who
attempted to divide the term into a life estate in one person and what
appeared to be a remainder in another, would find that the remainder
was void. The conception of freehold estates and the dignity that lay
behind that conception was, roughly speaking, that a life estate
engulfed a term for years; therefore, the effect of the pre-1609 view was
that the life tenant owned the entire term, and after his death, he might
provide for the disposition of whatever remained of the term. A
grantor was thus not permitted to fetter alienability even within a term
for years.
205
The judges in Manning's Case repudiated this understanding of the law.
Edward Manning, the decedent in the case, possessed a fifty-year term interest
in a mill. He attempted to leave a life interest in the mill to his wife Mary, and
upon Mary's death, to leave the remainder to Matthew Manning. The question
presented was whether Matthew could take under the terms of the disposition.
Had the law prior to 1609 been applied, Mary's life estate would have
extinguished Matthew's remainder. The Court, however, held "[tihat Matthew
Manning took.., not by way of remainder, but by way of an executory devise
"206
The cumulative effects of Pells v. Brown and Manning's Case were to raise
questions about the commitment of the common-law courts to a broad
principle of free alienability, and, more affirmatively, to provide a conceptual
apparatus to conveyancers who in the middle decades of the seventeenth
century began to search more earnestly than ever before for means by which
to keep intact the large landed estates of their gentlemen clients. Sir Orlando
Bridgman, who was one of England's great legal minds of the middle
seventeenth century but who was also politically out of favor in 1647,207 was
employed as a conveyancer at the time the Earl of Arundel approached him
with a delicate problem: How to provide adequately for his sons, one of whom
had become insane.
3. The Duke of Norfolk's Case
"Henry Frederick Howard, the Earl of Arundel and Surrey, was a member of
one of the oldest and most prominent families in England.'208 His problem was
as follows:
205See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 33-34.
2068 Co. Rep. 95a, 77 Eng. Rep. 619. On the future impact of Manning's Case and the
executory devise, see John Makdisi, The Vesting of Executory Interests, 59 TULANE L. REv.
366,371-72 (1984).
207Biographical data on Orlando Bridgman can be found in IV LORD CAMPBELL, LIvEs
OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 87-102 (1880); SIMPsoN, supra note 93, at 76-77.
208Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 19.
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In 1647 he was faced with the serious problem of how to provide for
certain of his younger children through the disposition of one of his
estates, the barony of Grostock. Thomas, the Earl's eldest son, was
insane; yet by law upon his father's death he was entitled to succeed
to the Earldom, which required enormous supporting family wealth.
The insanity of Thomas posed no small problem to the Earl. Some
provision had to be made for the possibility that Thomas might have
a son who, if born, would in turn succeed to the Earldom and therefore
should have its attendant estates. Moreover, there were also other
children to be provided for. The Earl's desire was that his next eldest
son, Henry, should have at least the income accruing from the barony
of Grostock during Thomas's life; and if Thomas should die in Henry's
lifetime without leaving male issue then living and if Henry should
succeed to the Earldom and its estates it was the Earl's intent that his
third son Charles, should have the income from the barony of
Grostock.2
Sir Orlando Bridgman, relying especially on Manning's Case, "used the device
of a term of years followed by an indestructible executory interest" in
effectuating the Earl's request.210 He drafted an instrument creating a
two-hundred year term of years with named trustees to oversee it, and
included the following provisions:
The property was to be held for the use of the Earl during his own
lifetime and then for his widow. Then during the life of the eldest son,
Thomas... and of his male issue, if any; it was to be in trust for the
benefit of the second son, Henry Howard, and the heirs male of his
body; but with the provision- and this was the essential feature
involved-that in case the eldest son, Thomas, should die without
issue during the life of Henry and thereby the Earldom with the estates
accompanying it should descend to Henry, then the trust as to this
Grostock barony was to be for the benefit of the brother Charles and
the heirs male of his body.
211
The Earl died in 1652 and his widow passed away in 1673. Thomas
succeeded to the estate, dying without male issue in 1677. In 1662, Charles II
restored to the Howard family the title of the Duke of Norfolk-which had been
forfeited in 1554--and Thomas became, at least in name, the fifth Duke of
Norfolk. Following Thomas's death, Henry, the second son, succeeded in turn
to the title.2 12 Two years before Thomas's death, in 1675, "legal title had been
2 09Id.
2 101d. at 35.
211Herbert Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REV. 538, 547 (1937).
2 12Id. at 543-47 (reviewing these facts at greater length). Arrangements had been made
for Thomas to live his adult life "in safe keeping in Padua," and he never took possession
1995]
49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
ostensibly transferred to Henry."213 After Thomas's death, Henry moved
further to secure his holdings by suffering a common recovery in order to
prevent his younger brother Charles from realizing his interest. 214 Charles
brought an action in Chancery seeking to enforce the terms of the agreement
and Henry defended his claim by asserting that Charles's interest was a
perpetuity and so void.215 The issue presented to the Court was whether
Charles's interest was a perpetuity and, even more fundamentally, what
constituted a perpetuity?
The case was to be heard by Heneage Finch, Lord Nottingham, in January,
1681. Finch had been born in 1621 into an old gentry family that traced its
pedigree to Henry Fitzherbert, who had been Chancellor in the time of Henry
I. Heneage's father had been Speaker of the House of Commons in the
Parliament of 1626. Heneage himself was admitted to the bar in 1645, and did
his best to avoid the political controversies of the Commonwealth period. With
the Restoration, Finch-who had gained respect for "his deep learning [and]
solid abilities"-was named Solicitor General by Charles II. He was also elected
to Parliament in 1661 as a representative of the University of Oxford. In 1673,
Finch was named Keeper of the Great Seal and carried out the functions of Lord
Chancellor; in 1675, he was named Lord Chancellor, and in 1681 he received
the title the Earl of Nottingham, by which he is generally known today.
Nottingham's career in Chancery would earn for him the title the "Father of
Equity.' 216
Realizing the importance of the case, Nottingham enlisted the services and
advice of three prominent common-law judges, Sir Francis Pemberton, Chief
Judge of King's Bench, Sir William Montagu, Lord Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, and Sir Francis North, Chief Judge of Common Pleas.217 All three
of the judges took the position that Henry should be allowed to take the estate
by common recovery. Montagu framed the issue the most clearly, arguing that
the insidious doctrine that an executory interest might be indestructible, which
had its start with Pells v. Brown, must be repudiated. Otherwise:
Admit that Case to be good Law, where will you stop, if you admit
the Limitation of a Term after an Estate-tail, where shall it end? For if
after one, it may as well be after two; and if after two, then as well after
twenty; for it may be said, if he die within twenty Years without Issue,
of his estates. Id. at 544-545. From the early 1660s onward, Henry occupied Arundel
House, the principal manor house.
2 13 1d. at 547.
214 See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 37.
21SId.
2 16The biographical information is drawn from IV LORD CAMPBELL, LivEs OFTHE LORD
CHANCELLORS 190-202 (1880).
217See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 38-39.
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and so if within 100, and there will be no end; and so a Perpetuity will
follow.
218
Nottingham, however, kept his own counsel. He ruled in favor of Charles,
and declared that English law could accommodate perpetuities, properly
qualified. Indeed, in the context of the time, Nottingham's decision can more
properly be said to have established a rule of perpetuities, rather than a rule
against perpetuities. 219 As if responding to Montagu's concerns, Nottingham
asked: "They will perhaps say, where will you stop .. .? Where? Why
everywhere, where there is not any Inconvenience, any Danger of a
Perpetuity.' 220 And to the question, how ought one to discern whether a
particular arrangement constituted a perpetuity, Nottingham replied that "the
Necessity of Things, and the Nature of Commerce" could serve as fit
standards.221
Lord Nottingham retired from the bench in 1682, and was succeeded as
Chancellor by Chief Justice North, one of the common-law judges who had
rendered advice in The Duke of Norfolk's Case. North took the first available
opportunity to repudiate Nottingham's decision, but Parliament in 1685
restored the rule as Nottingham had articulated it.222 Thus restored, the
principle of The Duke of Norfolk's Case "has not been shaken since."223
2183 Ch. Cas at 19,22 Eng. Rep. at 942-943, quoted in Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra
note 6, at 40 (analyzing Montagu's argument).
2 19See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 44 ("[w]hat evolved from
[Nottingham's] decision was... not a rule for perpetuities, but a rule of perpetuities").
2203 Ch. Cas. at 36,22 Eng. Rep. at 953, quoted in Haskins, supra note 6, at 43 (discussing
Nottingham's flexibility regarding what constituted an impermissible perpetuity); see
also GRAY, supra note 203 (providing further discussion on this point).
2213 Ch. Cas. at 31; 22 Eng. Rep. at 950.
22 2 0n the later history of The Duke of Norfolk's Case, see Barry, supra note 211, at
557-560.
22 3GRAY, supra note 203, at 162. Gray continues:
The Duke of Norfolk's Case marks the close of the first stage of the history
of the Rule against Perpetuities. It was now a settled point that a future
interest might be limited to commence on any contingency which must
occur within lives in being. Whether this period could be extended
remained to be determined.
Id. at 162-63.
The development of the modern rule against perpetuities, that an executory
interest, to be valid, must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after a life in
being at the time the interest is created, was a gradual process that is explored in GRAY,
supra note 203, at 169-77.
Some modern commentators have advocated a return to the more flexible
understanding of the Rule Against Perpetuities embodied in Lord Nottingham's
decision. See Adam J. Hirsch and William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L. J. 1, 55 n.223 (1992) (arguing that Lord Nottingham's reasoning in the
Duke of Norfolk's Case could provide a source "for fundamental rethinking" in the area
of perpetuities law).
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What is important for our purposes is the compromise that Lord Nottingham
forged between the needs of the gentry and the principle of free alienability. As
Haskins has observed, "[i]f any values were reflected in Nottingham's thinking,
they were almost certainly those of the landed gentry party to which he
belonged."224 Perpetual freeholds and unbarrable entails could have the effect
of creating irrational clogs on the alienability of land and were to be avoided.
But at the same time, the family estate was to be preserved, and kept secure
from those occasional irresponsible persons who would squander precious
resources. 225 The Rule Against Perpetuities, like so much else of English land
law, was the product of the revolutionary developments of the seventeenth
century.
B. The Strict Settlement
1. Background
A second device-the strict settlement-was also invented by the common
lawyers of the middle and later decades of the seventeenth century to secure
the continuity of the large landed estates.22 6 As Dukeminier and Krier make
clear,227 the principle of free alienability has always clashed with the interests
of wealthy families. A son impulsively wishes to draw on family resources to
satisfy some immediate fancy (daughters were usually not in a position to take
such action). His father, taking the long view, refuses to let his son have his way,
and-to ensure the son does nothing rash-tries to plan his estate in a way that
prevents the son from taking precipitate action after the father has passed from
the scene.
22 4See Haskins, Extending the Grasp, supra note 6, at 43.
22 5Haskins has stated:
Lord Nottingham's resolution of the perpetuities problem was the
kind of decision that would please Tory landowners of the 1680s.
These landowners did not want complete destructibility, which could
ruin the family estate in a generation. They did want freedom to transfer
land, but they also wanted some means of protecting the family from
lunatics, wastrels, gamblers, and the like by maintaining some degree
of control over the future disposition of the land. Lord Nottingham pro-
vided them with a compromise between complete alienability and the
power to tie land up for a perpetuity.
Id. at 44.
226 Concerning the strict settlement, Eileen Spring has observed:
The strict settlement occupies a prominent place in the history of
real property law. It does so because it was the culmination of
landowners' legal history, and because with its invention the
structure of English property law was substantially complete
and was to remain essentially unaltered until 1925, a structure
in one way and another to be marveled at.
EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND,
1300-1800 123(1993).
2 27 See supra note 180.
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In the fourteenth and for much of the fifteenth centuries, the large magnates
placed their reliance in such devices as unbarrable entails, but-as
noted-Taltarum's Case made such reliance treacherous.228 Opposition to
unbarrable entails continued to characterize the thinking of common lawyers
in the seventeenth century. Thus Edward Coke declared: "By the wisdom of
the Common Law all estates of inheritance were fee simple and what
contentions and mischiefs have crept into the quiet of the law by these fettered
inheritances, dailie experience teacheth us."229 There was thus a need to create
a system that did not make use of the disfavored unbarrable entail or the
despised perpetuity but that nevertheless could satisfy the requirements of the
landed gentry.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the common-law courts
began to deploy contingent remainders and fee tails in ways that held out some
promise the needs of the landed classes might be satisfied.23° These efforts,
however, went only part of the way satisfying the gentry. As Lloyd Bonfield
has observed, although the contingent remainder "began to provide a 'safe
harbour' for those settlors unwilling to dabble in perpetuities and other
executory interests of dubious validity,"231 these devices could not be used
2 28See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. Cf. GEORGE A. HOLMES, THE ESTATES
OF THE HIGHER NOBILITY IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 41-45 (1957) (providing
examples of the increasingly complicated arrangements made by the heads of important
families).
2 2 9 COKE ON LITrLETON 96 quoted in LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS,
1601-1740: THE ADOPTION OF THE STRICT SETTLEMENT 16-17 (1983). That Coke had in
mind unbarrable entails is clear from the criticism he levelled at the Statute De Donis.
Id. at17.
23OBonfield identifies four developments as crucial to these early efforts.
In particular, there were four developments. First, the decision in
Colethirst v. Bejushin [1 Plowden 20, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1551)] enabled
the landowner to employ alternative contingent remainders in marriage
settlements which would ensure that the patrimony descended to his
eldest son in tail, or, if he predeceased his parents, to a younger son
so long as both were living at the time of settlement. Secondly, the
court in Wild's Case [6 Co. Rep. 16b, 77 Eng. Rp. 277 (1599)] confirm-
ed that a gift over to children after a grant to their parents might take
effect by way of remainder even though the children were not in esse
at the time of the devise, thereby facilitating the execution of pre-
nuptial settlements. Thirdly, the common law courts undertook to
protect settlements of short-term duration from certain of the rigours
of the rules of destructibility by modifying the rule in Shelley's Case
[1 Co. Rep. 88b, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (1579)]. Finally, the courts endeavour-
ed to construe remainders in settlements which did not tend towards
perpetuities as vested rather than as contingent if such an interpreta-
tion was at all possible.
BONFIELD, supra note 229, at 25.
23 11d. at 26.
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apart from a traditional understanding of freehold estates. 232 The fee tail, used
in combination with contingent remainders, remained popular as well, but "the
entail was settled in the heir male ... with the hope, rather than the assurance,
that it would descend unimpinged."233
The problem, then, was this: A wealthy magnate might be able to pass
Blackacre to the generation that followed him, but he could not be sure that it
would not thereafter be squandered. The conveyancers who worked on behalf
of the large estate holders were charged with the responsibility of devising an
2 32Bonfield has traced the rules that governed the use of contingent remainders in the
early seventeenth century:
Because of the fear that contingent remainders might be employed to
create lengthy settlements, the common law courts formulated a
number of ... requirements which applied exclusively to these interests.
By far the most important was that the estate which supported a contin-
gent remainder must be a freehold interest. The legal rationale supporting
this rule was ... related to the problem of seisin: if the supporting estate
was not a freehold, where would seisin lie pending the occurrence of
the contingency?...
A corollary to this rule recognized that in a conveyance of a freehold
followed by a contingent remainder, the contingent remainder must
vest or fail before or upon the termination of its supporting freehold
estate....
If by its terms the contingent remainder did not operate within these
rules, the interest would not be protected by the law; or, as contemporary
lawyers would say, it was "destroyed." For the most part, these rules of
destructibility of contingent remainders were successful in frustrating
attempts to create lengthy settlements in legal estates.
Id. at 26-27.
Bonfield explored the early seventeenth-century case law to sketch out the
permissible boundaries for reliance upon contingent remainders. Id. at 27-34.
Summarizing the rules,
The doctrine enunciated, one of 'possibilities,' allowed the judges to
defeat remainders which were based upon contingencies that were
considered to be too remote. But the definition developed was hazy,
and perhaps purposely so, because the doctrine supplied a technical
reason to set aside sttlements which fettered inheritances for more
than a generation, while allowing the judges to uphold ones that
did not.
Id. at 34. Cf. Charles Sweet, Double Possibilities, 30 LAw Q. REV. 353 (1914) (analyzing the
early common law rules regarding "possibilities" and contingent remainders); and
Charles Sweet, Contingent Remainders and Other Possibilities, 27 YALE L. J. 977 (1918)
(further exploring these issues).
233 BONFIELD, supra note 229, at 49. A portion of Bonfield's book is given over to a study
of surviving records of strict settlements, and he indicates that the most popular form
of settlement included contingent remainders and fee tails: "This form, 'life estate to
groom, remainder to bride for life as jointure, remainder in tail to the heirs male of their
bodies,' was, with various modifications, employed in sixty-four of the eighty-four
(76.2%) marriage settlements in the data set." Id.
This form of settlement was vulnerable on at least two fronts. It could be broken
should the holder of the fee tail suffer a common recovery, and it could be broken where
the estate is alienated while the remainders were contingent. See id. at 51.
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instrument that might both withstand judicial scrutiny and succeed in meeting
this need.
2. Purefoy v. Rogers, the Conveyancers' Response, and the
Development of the Strict Settlement
The essential problem thus remained the question of the long-term security
of estate planning. The decision of Chancery in Purefoy v. Rogers (1670) only
made matters more difficult.23 4 Harold Berman has described the decision
thus:
[I]n the case of Purefoy v. Rogers [it was held] that if A gave (or left
by will) land to B, with the condition that after B's death it should pass
to B's first son who shall reach the age of 21-then B could frustrate
the donor's intention by disposing of the land at any time before he
had a son who reached the age of 21. The contingent remainder ... ,
that is, the minor son's interest, could be destroyed. The technical
reason for this rule was that if B should die before his eldest son reached
21, no one would own the land-there would be an 'abeyance of seisin'
and this would be an intolerable situation.
235
Sir Orlando Bridgman, the conveyancer who had drafted the instrument that
was at issue in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, has also been traditionally associated
with the development of the strict settlement, although the evidence
supporting this association has been called into question.236 But determining
exact responsibility for the creation of this legal institution is unnecessary. It is
sufficient to point out that the strict settlement was a product of the 1660s and
1670s and that it met the needs and embodied the ideology of the landed gentry.
The form of the strict settlement was intended to respond to the decision in
Purefoy v. Rogers, but it also struck a blow at the sort of unfettered freedom to
alienate that had vexed the landed gentry since Taltarun's Case repudiated the
unbarrable entail. The strict settlement operated as follows: It was proposed
that a trust be interposed between the son (B in the above hypothetical) and
the grandson (the minor son in the above hypothetical) and that the trustees
2342 Wms. Saunders 380, 21 Eng. Rep. 980 (1670). Simpson sees Purefoy v. Rogers as a
serious limitation on the principle of free alienability found in Chudleigh's Case: 'In the
course of the seventeenth century the ruling in Chudleigh's Case was whittled down until
it became the rule in Purefoy v. Rogers .... "See SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 204-05.
2 3 5 HAROLD J. BERMAN, MATERIALS FOR THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION AND THE MODERNIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw 109 (1995) (unpublished
lecture materials on file with author). The following discussion of the operation of the
strict settlement, including the quotation from Casner and Leach, infra note 238 and
accompanying text, relies heavily on Berman's unpublished lecture materials.
236 See BONFIELD, supra note 229, at 60-65 (reviewing the evidence pro et contra on the
question of Bridgman's role in the creation of the strict settlement and finding much of
it to be the product of eighteenth-century legend). But see SPRING, supra note 226, at
141-142 (questioning Bonfield's analysis of the evidence against Bridgman's invention
of the strict settlement).
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should be charged with the responsibility of preserving the contingent
remainder. B would receive a life estate which he could not alienate, since legal
title would have vested in the trustees, and the contingent remainder held by
the trustees for the grandson would vest upon the grandson's birth.237
The next step was to make sure that the grandson carried on the arrangement
for the next generation. Casner and Leach explain that continuity was made to
depend on the aging process and the maturity of the son and grandson. By the
time the grandson reaches the age of majority, the son would have reached his
forties or fifties and would:
feel[] himself the guardian of the family honor, tradition, and estates.
G. may be rebellious and undisciplined, but he cannot disentail and
thereby acquire a fee simple in remainder, because disentailment is
possible only for a tenant in tail in possession; so, no matter what wild
and radical ideas G may have at the age of 21, he can do the family
estates no damage. It was at this point that, traditionally, S called G in
for a chat. He explained to him that, having arrived at manhood's
threshold, G would be wanting to make the Grand Tour of the
continent, and present himself at the London season; this would take
money, but there were family funds, controlled by S, available for
members of the family who showed that they had the family interests
at heart. S further explained that one of the important interests of the
family was the continuation of the family estates and that there were
a few papers to be signed to that end, now and at once. Thus gently
nudged, it was traditional for G to sign as requested and thus make
available to himself those advantages which flow from a generous
parental allowance. The resettlement which would be created at this
point comprised the following steps:
a) S, the life tenant, and the trustees surrendered their estates to G,
the remainderman in tail. This made him a tenant in tail in possession.
237Berman notes:
[the strict settlement]. . . made it possible to preserve the form of
this rule [that of Purefoy v. Rogers] while avoiding its impact upon
the great families who sought to maintain their dominant position
over generations and centuries. [There was] created a trust to stand
between S., the son, and G., the grandson, the trustees being charged
with preserving contingent remainders; and the trustees estate vested
... immediately upon the gift to S. The formula was: To S for life,
remainder to Trustees for life of S in trust for life and to preserve
contingent remainders, remainder to S's first son in tail male (i.e., to
descend in the male line), with usccessive remainders in tail male to
the other sons of S. By this scheme the son, S, is deprived of his power
to convey the land prior to the birth of a grandson, since there is a
vested estate in the trustees; and any attempt by the trustees to dispose
of the land contrary to the trust will be void. When the grandson, G,
is bom, his remainder vests.
Berman, supra note 235, at 109.
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b) G suffered a recovery in favor of the family solicitor, thus making
the solicitor the owner of the fee simple.
c) The family solicitor conveyed to S for life, remainder to G for life,
remainder to Trustees for the lives of S and G to preserve contingent
remainders, remainders to the first and other sons G in tail male,
remainders to the second and other sons of S in tail male. Thus the basic
pattern was pushed forward one generation. S could now rest easy in
the confident belief that G would have no power to put the estates out
of the family until he had a son 21 years old; and by that time G in his
turn would be settled down, devoted to a shire life of farming and fox
hunting, and determined to see that the family estates were
preserved.238
3. The Social Significance of the Strict Settlement
Historians in recent decades have come to understand the strict settlement
as a device that had the utmost importance for the functioning of elite social
structures in England for a period that runs roughly from the Restoration of
Charles II to the outbreak of World War I. Sir John Habakkuk, in a series of
works spanning better than a half-century has pioneered this effort.23 9 His
23 8CASNER & LEACH, supra note 188, at 357-358.
Eileen Spring recounts the predicament of the poet Percy Shelley, who, at the age
of twenty-one, attempted to break the strict settlement that had kept the family estate
intact:
Settlement's force.., is starkly demonstrated in the story of the poet
Shelley. A descendant of the family of sixteenth-century legal notoriety,
Shelley was of their blood but not of their spirit. He refused on idealistic
grounds to join his father in resettling the family estate, balking at passing
it on to his unborn son, "one whom I know not-who might, instead of
being the benefactor of mankind, be its bane, or use [the estate] for the
worst purposes." Unable to make his father see matters in this unaristo-
cratic light but in need of an income until he should inherit, Shelley set
out to bar the entail so far as he could do so by himself, planning to borrow
on his expectations.... [After finding that such borrowing was practically
impossible] Shelley came to the realization that the only reasonable way for
him to gain an immediate income was to capitulate to his father and
resettle the estate. "When I look back," he later wrote, "I do not see what
else I could have done than submit. What is called firmness would have
left me in total poverty."
SPRING, supra note 226, at 125-126. Cf. BARBARA ENGLISH & JOHN SAVILLE, STRIcr
SETTLEMENT: A GUIDE FOR HISTORIANS (1983) (reviewing the operation of settlement and
its impact on elite families in the period between 1660 and 1880).
239H.J. Habakkuk, English Landownership, 1680-1740, 10 ECON. HIST. REv. 2 (1940) (a
study of "Itihe general drift of property in the sixty years after 1690... in favour of the
largeestate and the greatlord"). See also H.J. Habakkuk, The Rise and Fall of English Landed
Families, 1600-1800, 29 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 187 (5th series, 1979)
(reviewing marriage and inheritance patterns and sales practices among the gentry in
the two centuries specified); H.J. Habakkuk, The Rise and Fall of English Landed Families,
1600-1800, 11, 30 TRANSACTIONSOFTHE ROYAL HIST. Soc'y 199 (5th series 1980) (reviewing
issues of mortgages, borrowing, and indebtedness on the part of the English landed
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work tends to avoid grand sociological speculation and is concentrated instead
on questions central to the internal operations of the system. How did the strict
settlement system of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries differ from
what had come before? Why did men who enjoyed fee simple interests in land
choose to become life tenants? How were younger sons and daughters
provided for in a system that openly favored primogeniture?
Habakkuk's answers to these and other similar questions are interesting and
stimulating. But perhaps the profoundest part of his argument occurs in his
discussion of the sense of enduring class solidarity the strict settlement
promoted. The gentry would not have become or remained the ruling class of
England for over two hundred years without the external pressure created by
a legally enforceable doctrine of strict settlement.
24°
J.V. Beckett has made similar arguments. From the English Revolution to the
opening volleys of the Great War:
[L~and was the most important single passport to social and political
consideration, and the more a family owned, the greater its chance of
preferment. Land represented not merely wealth, but stability and
continuity, a fixed interest in the state which conferred the right to
govern. Rolling acres guaranteed admission, sooner or later, into the
inner sanctums of power, both social and political.
24 1
And it was the strict settlement which guaranteed that land remained within
families that possessed power, both social and political. But not only did the
strict settlement play a conservative function in keeping intact the holdings of
the large estates; it also played a positive role in forming the aristocratic ethos
elites); H.J. HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEBT, AND THE ESTATES SYSTEM: ENGLISH
LANDOWNERSHIP, 1650-1950 (1994) (a massive work of synthesis, examining all aspects
of the strict settlement and estate practice in the centuries specified).
24OHabakkuk argued:
I believe that but for the strict settlement the pattern of landownership
might have been different. There were strong centrifugal forces at work
in the estates system, even in the period when it was evidently dominant,
and some landowners, when they were legally free to do so, subordin-
ated the interests of the family to their immediate passions .... [11n many
families such propensities were widely spread; caution and prudence
were not the characteristic aristocratic virtues. The fact that some families
maintained their estates intact for long periods without the support of
settlement does not mean that the desire to continue association between
family and estate was strong enough to maintain the estates system as a
whole. It needed the nourishment of constant exercise and continual
support. The availability of a particular legal device provided a focus for
family feelings, so that members of estate-owning families made the
critical decisions-in a form not easily revocable-at a given point in
time, under the influence of the permanent sentiments of their social
group rather than the casual whims of its individual members.
HABAKKU, MARRIAGE, DEBT, AND THE ESTATES SYSTEM: ENGLISH LANDOWNERSHIP, supra
note 239, at 75-76.
24 1J.V. BECKETT, THE ARISTOCRACY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1914, 43 (1986).
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that the governing classes of England lived by for over two centuries. "Since
estates were a trust from generation to generation, the ethos demanded that
they be preserved, and preferably improved."242 Principles of good
stewardship were to be followed, which demanded that modem agricultural
methods be utilized and natural resources properly exploited.243 It was only
natural that the landed classes, both gentry and aristocracy, would direct this
sense of duty not only to private economic matters, but also to the public
welfare. 244 Out of a sense of obligation, the English landed classes came to
assume positions of leadership, both locally and nationally, and to discharge
the duties of office with a disinterested sense of public spirit.24 5
242 d. at 6.
2431d. at 6-7. Cf. Joan Thirsk, Agricultural Innovations and Their Diffusion, in V THE
AGRARIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES pt. II 571-581 (1985) (detailing the
agricultural innovations introduced in the period 1700-1750).
244The terms "aristocracy" and "gentry" are used interchangeably. Caution is
necessary when making such broad generalizations. Significant differences existed
between the gentry and the aristocracy on many levels. Strictly defined as members of
the peerage of the realm, the aristocracy, for the later seventeenth and much of the
eighteenth centuries, was severely limited in numbers, consisting of about 160 titled
families. See GORDON E. MINGAY, ENGLISH LANDED SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
6 (1963). The gentry, on the other hand, probably numbered somewhere between 8,000
and 20,000 families, depending on how one defines one's terms. Id. Indeed, many
members of the upper levels of the gentry "would have been regarded as nobility by
continental standards." JOHN ASHTON CANNON, ARISTOCRATIC CENTURY: THE PEERAGE
OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 10 (1984). Mingay and Cannon, in their above-cited
works, have both explored areas where gentryand aristocracy differed in their economic
situation and social expectations. Nevertheless, where the need to conserve landed
estates was concerned, the gentry and the aristocracy were of one mind. Michael Bush
has explained:
The peerage and the gentry were closely related, sharing the same
belief in birthright, conceiving themselves as members of the same
ruling class and deriving their wealth and local influence from the
same landed source. The connexion was confirmed by kinship and
recruitment. Gentry rose into the peerage while the younger sons of
the peerage descended into the gentry. Intermarriage between peerage
and gentry families was common. Furthermore, it could not be said
that the two had mutually opposed interests: if the one gained an
increase in power and wealth it was not necessarily at the other's
expense.
MICHAEL L. BUSH, THE ENGLISH ARISTOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS 40-41 (1984).
2 45 See BECKETT, supra note 241, at 9-10. Beckett declared that:
The responsibility exercised by the aristocracy in economic develop-
ment was matched by a similar concept of duty and service in regard
to the leadership of both the locality and the nation. The aristocratic
power base lay in rural England, symbolized by the country house
and its attendant park on which they lavished vast sums of money to
maintain the family's prestige.... [Miost aristocrats recognized that
time in the country made sound economic sense and fulfilled their
duty to stand at the head of the community....
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Eileen Spring, finally, has weighed in with an evaluation of the strict
settlement that-at least when seen from the vantage point of social importance
of landed estates-does not substantially differ with Habakkuk and Beckett.246
Spring argues that the strict settlement "established a family constitution, the
character of which is summed up in three words: patrilineal, primogenitive,
and patriarchal."247 It was both the product of a gentry that wished to
consolidate its political power and social status, and a means by which the
values of that class came to be reinforced: "[Tlhere can be no doubt that in
giving the aristocratic ethos a legal vehicle, settlement went far to strengthen
it."248
Thus the spirit of the English Revolution infused the land. The leadership
class that emerged victorious in the seventeenth century had found the means
to cement its position in society. The principle of free alienability was balanced
against dynastic interests. Estates were consolidated and preserved, and the
aristocratic ethos reinforced and transmitted forward in time, as fathers passed
on to sons the obligations of "good birth." This sense of duty and
responsibility-owed first to family, then to nation, finally to generations past
and those as yet unborn-that animated the English aristocracy for so long,
would finally exhaust itself in places like Verdun and Ypres. That it managed
[Tihe concept of service was [also] carried into the government of
the state. With their large stake in the land, the aristocracy expected to
govern, and they often did so at great personal cost, since London life
was expensive and neither MPs nor peers were paid. In the wake of
the Revolution of 1688, the aristocracy came to control every aspect of
government, both executive and legislative.
Id.
2461t must, however, be noted that on a somewhat different topic-the impact of the
strict settlement on the structure of the English family-Spring has taken a powerfully
articulated and distinctive stance, challenging much of the accepted historiography. For
example, Lawrence Stone has argued that the creation of the strict settlement-like the
abolition of the Court of Wards-was representative of a new individualism asserting
itself in the middle and latter decades of the seventeenth century and played the role in
the creation of an "affective family." LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE
IN ENGLAND, 1500-1800 239-244 (1977). Lloyd Bonfield has also generally endorsed this
interpretation of the strict settlement. See Lloyd Bonfield, Marriage, Property, and the
-AffectiveFamily,"' 1 LAW IST. REV. 297 (1983). See also Lloyd Bonfield, Affective Families,
Open Elites, and Strict Family Settlements in Early Modern England, 29 ECoN. HIST. REV.
341 (2d series, 1986); Lloyd Bonfield, Strict Settlement and the Family: A Differing View,
41 ECON. HIST. REV. 461 (2d series, 1988). Eileen Spring has vigorously challenged this
interpretation of the evidence. Eileen Spring, The Family, Strict Settlement, and Historians,
18 CAN. J. HIST. 379 (1983); Eileen Spring, Law and Theory of the Affective Family, 16 ALBION
1 (1984); Eileen Spring, The Strict Settlement: Its Role in Family History, 41 ECON. HIST.
REV. 454 (2d series, 1988). The resolution of this debate is peripheral to our main
thesis--that the strict settlement was a creation of the English Revolution and allowed
the landed gentry to consolidate a position of primacy in English society that lasted for
over two centuries.
24 7See SPRING, supra note 226, at 144.
248 1d. at 145.
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to hold center stage for over two centuries is a tribute, at least in part, to the
success of the legal institution known as the strict settlement.
V. THE CREATION OF MODERN CHANCERY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTS
AND MORTGAGES
A. The Statute of Uses and the Rise of Modern Chancery
1. The Conceptual Rigidity of the Common Law Scheme of Estates
and the Feoffment to Uses
In England, at the time Henry VII ascended to the throne, there were really
two systems of land law that existed side by side. There was, first, the common
law scheme of estates, which was conceived of as a hierarchy of interests in
land with the fee simple at its apex, and which used the doctrine of seisin as
the means of determining who legitimately enjoyed a freehold interest in a
given piece of real estate. But there also co-existed with the common law
scheme of estates a system of rights enforceable in Chancery that had
developed around the "use."249
Landholders in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries wished to avoid the
common law scheme of estates where possible for two reasons. The first was a
desire to escape the requirement of the feudal incidents. The second was the
longing for a system that avoided some of the conceptual rigidity of the
common law scheme, thus accommodating more complex transactions.
The feudal incidents are discussed above.250 But even where the satisfaction
of feudal incidents was not a concern, one might have wished to avoid the
common law system because of its inflexibility. The conceptual rigidity of the
system was the result of enormous stress being placed on seisin and
enfeoffment ("livery of seisin") as the foundation of most transactions. The
concept of seisin has been called a "mystery" by no less an authority than
Maitland, 251 but might best be understood as the outward and visible sign of
the ultimate right to possess, use, and alienate a given parcel of land.252
249 The contrast is set out well in Percy Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates,
18 IOWA L. REv. 425, 425 (1933).
25OSee supra notes 64-68, 76-77, and 95, and accompanying text (analyzing the feudal
incidents and the desire of landholders to avoid their consequences).
25 1See F.W. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAW Q. REv. 481 (1886). Maitland was
speaking ironically.
252Bordwell states:
Seisin and disseisin meant quite different things to our medieval
lawyers. The one suggested peace and quiet, the other robbery,
burglary, piracy, and the like.... Seisin was fundamental. "It was
so important that we may almost say that the whole system of our
land law was law about seisin and its consequences"' (quoting
B F. POLLOCK AND F.W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 30) ....
"Seisin meant possession....
"But if seisin meant possession, it meant much more than what
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Enfeoffment consisted of the handing over of seisin and was the formal
transfer of a landed estate. To be valid, livery of seisin required the entry onto
the land of the parties to the conveyance and the performance of acts which
third parties would understand as the handing over of the estate by the grantor
to the grantee. Enfeoffment, furthermore, had to take place in the present.253 A
could not enter his estate together with B and declare to B that "you are hereby
enfeoffed of this estate to take effect next St. Crispin's Day."254
Reinforcing this rule on enfeoffment, was the basic principle that seisin had
to be continuous. Because enfeoffment could occur only in the present and
because seisin could suffer no gaps, a freehold estate in futuro could not be
created.255
This conceptual rigidity ruled out of bounds any transaction that did not
take effect immediately. Landholders thus found it advisable to search for
alternatives to the common-law scheme of estates as a means of structuring
their more complex property arrangements. It was in this search for alternatives
that the "use" was invented.
we ordinarily think of as possession, the power to control a physical
thing. It was closely connected with the idea of enjoyment.
Bordwell, supra note 6, at 592-593.
By the early seventeenth century courts were forced to deal with the limits of the
right to possess, use, and alienate a given parcel of land in the context of litigation over
what sort of activities constituted a nuisance. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From an
Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
761, 765-81 (1979) (analyzing early case-law on the relationship of seisin and nuisance).
2 53 Bordwell states:
The transfer of the freehold was confined to a present transfer because
the freehold was the possession and the possession could be shifted only
by acts of possession such as delivery and entry. When these acts took
place, the change of possession or freehold took place and not at some
subsequent time.
Percy Bordwell, The Conversion of the Use to a Legal Interest, 21 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1935).
254 Livery of seisin ... meant delivery of possession. It was the operative
fact of the feoffment, and the feoffment dominated the transfer of land.
. .. As the livery was the operative fact of the feoffment and not the
charter, which was merely evidentiary, the feoffment was effective
instantly or not at all. Livery was a present, physical fact, and unlike
agreement or intention could not reach into the future. As a conse-
quence, we have the common law scheme of estates. Such only as
could be conceived of in terms of the present were possible."
Bordwell, supra note 6, at 593.
255Bordwell describes the problem:
Ruled out of the common law scheme of estates was the freehold
infuturo .... [There cannot be a situation] where after a grant to one,
the continuity is broken by a gap and then a second freehold is limited
to someone else, as to B for life and one year after B's death to A. The
common law abhorred a vacuum and would not allow the freehold to
be in abeyance.
The Conversion of the Use Into a Legal Interest, supra note 253, at 5.
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The term "use" was "a vernacular term derived from the old French oeps,
which was in turn derived from the Latin opus.' 256 The idea was that seisin
would be granted to one party for the benefit of another. As Bean puts it, "Land
was granted to A to the use of B: the grant could have been either by B himself
or by a third party who intended that the land should be held for the benefit
of B."257 The beneficiary of this arrangement was called the cestui que use, a term
derived from Law French, which is retained in the law of trusts and estates even
today.258
The doctrine of the use is traceable to the efforts of the late thirteenth-century
Franciscans "to live without property of any sort or kind."2 59 Since the
Franciscans could not own property outright, but nevertheless had to eat and
drink, wear clothing and reside in habitations, some third party had to hold
property for their benefit.
Although, as Bean indicates, reliance on the use "appears to have begun
among the lower orders of feudal society," by the time one reaches the close of
the fourteenth century "a number of important landowners" had turned to this
device as a way of making their post mortem dispositions. 260 The result was that
"[iun the years 1350-1500 landowners.., enjoyed a freedom in the disposition
of their inheritances that was denied to their thirteenth-century ancestors."26 1
Initially, and for the entire duration of the fourteenth century as well as much
of the first half of the fifteenth, the enforcement of uses occurred in the
ecclesiastical courts.262 Only gradually, over the course of the middle decades
2 56J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM, 1215-1540 (1968).
257ld. at 104. Richard Helmholz has described the operation of the use:
The holder of the freehold land-the feoffor-would convey land during
his lifetime to feoffees to uses. They in turn held it for the benefit of the
feoffor, or sometimes of a third party-the cestui que use-under
instructions to convey the land to persons to be named in the feoffor's will.
Richard H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1503, 1503
(1979).
25 8Bean has noted that "this is a shortened form of the phrase cestui que use lefeoffinent
fuit fait." BEAN, DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM, supra note 256, at 104, n.2. The full
expression signifies that one party was being enfeoffed with the estate for the benefit of
the other.
2 59F.W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 IARv. L. REV. 127, 136 (1894). Bean has
challenged Maitland's account of the origin of uses by pointing to evidence that some
sort of primitive use was in existence prior to the emergence of the Franciscans. See BEAN,
DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM supra note 256, at 129. But even Bean concedes that the
use derived its conceptual apparatus and sophistication from Romanist and canonist
sources. Id. at 131-32. Cf. S.W. DeVine, The Franciscan Friars, the Feoffment to Uses, and
Canonical Theories of Property Enjoyment Before 1535, 10 J. LEGAL IST. 1 (1989) (further
examining the connections between the Franciscans and the feoffment to uses).
260BEAN, DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM supra note 256, at 122, 124.
261 BEAN, supra note 34, at 553.
262See Helmholz, supra note 257, at 1504-11.
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of the fifteenth century, did Chancery become the usual court to which one
would resort for enforcement.263 Thus "[b]y the 1450s, 90 per cent of all cases
coming before the Chancellor were concerned with uses."264
2. 1536-1660: From the Statute of Uses to the Statute of Tenures
As already indicated, the Tudor monarchs were in steady need of a healthy
cash flow nearly from the time Henry VII defeated Richard III at Bosworth
Field. The promise represented by feudal incidents that were going uncollected
was simply something that could not be resisted. As already noted, Henry
adopted a two-pronged approach to this issue. On the one hand, he set out to
revitalize feudal institutions and sources of revenues, a step discussed
above.265 But he also decided that he must put a stop to the extent possible to
the practice of evading feudal incidents.
This commitment meant that Henry would have to challenge the whole
practice of the enfeoffment to uses. The reliance of the landed classes on the
use had become pervasive.266 Henry decided that he would attempt to have
enacted in Parliament a statute that would force the landed classes to reduce
this reliance, and the result was the Statute of Uses. Maitland declared that "the
Statute of Uses was forced upon an unwilling Parliament by an extremely
strong-willed King."267 Enactment of the Statute in 1536 was the product of
several years of pressure brought to bear on Parliament by Henry.268
The Preamble to the Statute of Uses consisted of an extended diatribe against
the unscrupulous employment of this device. Uses were the product of "diverse
26 3For analysis of this transition, see Margaret E. Avery, An Evaluation of the
Effectiveness of the Court of Chancery Under the Lancastrian Kings, 86 LAw Q. REV. 84 (1970);
Margaret E. Avery, History of Equitable Jurisdiction Before 1460, 42 BULL. HIST. RES. 129
(1969); A.D. Hargreaves, Equityand the Latin Side of Chancery, 68 LAw Q. REV. 481 (1952).
26 4See Avery, The Effectiveness of Chancery, supra note 263, at 84.
265See supra notes 64-68 and 76-77, and accompanying text.
26 6Roland Greene Usher states that by the year 1500 "[tlhe Common LawJudges [had]
declared more than once that the greater part of the land of England was held by uses."
Roland Greene Usher, The Significance and Early Interpretation of the Statute of Uses, in I
WASH. U. (ST. LOUIs) STUD. pt. ii (1913) at 42.
26 7FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 34 (1936).
26 8Holdsworth has argued that a draft bill introduced into Parliament in 1529 should
be taken as the direct ancestor of the Statute of Uses, although theprovisions of this draft
bill differed from the final product in some significant details. See HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 2, at IV, 450-51, and 572-74. This view was subsequently challenged by E.W. Ives,
The Genesis of the Statute of Uses, 82 ENG. HIST. REV. 673 (1967). The ultimate resolution
of this controversy is unnecessary for our concerns. Evidence of this controversy suffices
to demonstrate that extensive reliance on uses had resulted in a significant loss of
revenue to the Crown, which Henry sought to repair by legislative action.
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and sundry Imaginations, subtle Inventions and Practices," and resulted in
"fraudulent Feoffments, Fines, Recoveries, and other Assurances."269 The
purpose of the Statute was "to extirp[] and extinguish[]" these practices. 270
Henry VIII, however, could not simply declare the use abolished. To have
abolished the use tout court would have resulted in enfeoffing those lawyers
and others who were serving as feoffees for beneficiaries. 271 Thus:
the legal title had instead to be taken away from those feoffees and
given to the beneficiaries. The statute accordingly provided that where
A was seised of property to the 'use, trust, or confidence' of B, then B
was thereafter to be deemed to be seised of the property 'to all intents,
purposes, and constructions in the law, of and in such like estates as
[he] had or shall have in use. In other words, whenever A was seised
of property to the use of B, the statute effected a notional or fictional
livery of seisin from A to B. B, the cestuy que use, was to be the statutory
owner of the legal estate, and the feoffee (A) merely a channel through
which the seisin passed in an instant of time to B.... The purpose and
effect of executing the use was that the beneficial owner would always
die seised, so that his last will and testament was ineffective at common
law and the feudal incidents attached on descent to his heir. The
common-law position was so completely restored that the Crown
regained its prerogative rights in addition to wardship and relief.
272
Subsequent judicial interpretation of the Statute resulted in three categories
of uses being exempted from execution: These were uses on other than
freehold estates; uses imposing active duties upon the feoffee; and the use on
a use.
2 73
26917 Hen. VIII c. 10 (pmbl.).
270Id.
271 See JoHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 292 (3d ed. 1979).
2721d. at 217. On the feudal incidents of wardship and relief, see supra notes 51-58,
64-68, and 76-77 and accompanying text. By its terms, the Statute of Uses not only
executed most uses, italso reinstated primogeniture as the exclusive means of conveying
landed estates between the generations. This restoration provoked a popular outcry
sufficiently forceful that, four years later in 1540, Parliament enacted the Statute of Wills
which "conferred for the first time the legal power to dispose of freeholds by will, save
that tenants by knight-service had to leave at least one third to descend." Id. at 218.
273 SeeJohn L. Barton, The Statute of Uses and the Trust of Freeholds, 82 LAw Q. REV. 215,
215(1966).
Bordwell makes the point that the Statute did not explicitly exclude the active trust
from its terms. Rather, this resultwas the product of subsequent judicial reasoning about
the functioning of uses:
One of the characteristics of the use had been.., that the cestui had the
right to take the rents and profits; hence in a case which arose soon after
the Statute, it was said that if the feoffee was himself to take the rents
and profits and deliver them to the beneficiary, this was not a use. It
was a short step from this to hold that such a case was not within the
Statute and that in such a case the feoffee retained the possession in
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Two fundamentally different approaches arose to interpreting the Statute of
Uses, especially as it pertained to reliance upon the use as a means of creating
future interests that impeded alienability on the part of heirs.274 Chudleigh's
Case (1594), which resolved the question of the so-called "contingent use" in
favor of the common law, became the vehicle by which the two competing
visions of the Statute of Uses were framed. The first approach is associated with
Sir Edward Coke and might be termed the strict approach. Coke grounded his
interpretation on what he conceived the purpose of the Statute to be: the
extirpation of those uses which had the effect of evading the common law
scheme of estates and which thereby posed a threat to the health of the
Kingdom. In his report of Chudleigh's Case, Coke echoed the language of the
Statute of Uses by declaring that a use was a "trust" or "confidence," thus
perhaps assisting in the linguistic transformation by which property
arrangements once structured by reference to the "use" came to be grouped
under the rubric of "trust."275 But Coke also understood King's Bench to declare
order that he might carry out his trust. Thus arose that 'second spring
of uses' of which Bacon wrote.
Bordwell, supra note 253, at 13.
274 See COQUILLETrE, FRANCIS BACON, supra note 191 at 129-30.
English land law sometimes seemed like a constant struggle between
dynasty-minded settlors, who tried to tie up family lands for genera-
tions, and heirs who wanted to sell the lands with clear title for cash.
One way to attempt to tie up the land from free alienation was to create
contingent future interests in the land. To use a simplistic example: a
grant to "B and his heirs, as long as they live on the land, remainder to
C," might tie up the land if enforceable. But it was not enforceable,
because it violated one of strict common law rules governing contin-
gent future interests, namely, that once a grantor parts with a fee
simple "there is nothing left to grant, for he has exhausted the whole
quantum of his interest." The contingent remainder, granted to C and
his heirs, was void, and B could sell the land with clear title. Ingenious
lawyers, seeking to escape common law limitations and to tie up land
for their dynasty-minded clients, turned for help to the Statute of Uses.
Perhaps contingent future interests in land created through a "use"
would be treated more leniently by the courts? For example, suppose
the grant above were "to A and his heirs, to the use of B and his heirs,
so long as they shall live on this land, remainder to C and his heirs."
Before the Statute of Uses, it could be argued that the above delivered
a full fee simple to A, and so did not violate the common law rule. If
Chancery enforced the executory interest in equity, it would be effective
as a "shifting use," i.e., on the happening of the contingency, the use
would 'shift' from B and his heirs to C and his heirs. Of course the entire
legal estate would be fully vested, at least technically, in A and his heirs,
subject to the use. After the Statute of Uses, the "use" would be executed,
and A would drop out of the picture, and B would receive a legal estate.
But would C's executory interest be enforceable, or would it be void as
contrary to the common law limitations?
275 0n the probable origins of the term "trust" in the Statute of Uses, see MILSOM, supra
note 2, at 207-08.
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that at common law a use was not capable of conferring rights on the party
who was its beneficiary,276 and that contingent uses could not survive the
adoption of the Statute of Uses. 277 In essence, Coke found in Chudleigh's Case
authority for his position that a use had to conform to the rules of possession
governing the common law scheme of estates.
Sir Francis Bacon, in his Reading on the Statute of Uses, adopted what might
be called a broad understanding of the use. Although he had been on the same
side as Coke in the oral argument to Chudleigh's Case, he quarreled with Coke
over the relationship of the use to the common law scheme of estates. Bordwell
states:
Bacon, unlike Coke, liked the use. He was not, like Coke, enamoured
of the old common law and saw in the logic of the use the chance to
escape from the confines of the latter. In contrast with the scholastic,
common law jargon of Coke, his exposition of the differences between
the use and the possession was modem and universal. Far from
276A use is a trust or confidence, which is not issuing out of the land, but
as a thing collateral annexed in privity to the estate, and to the person
touching the land, scil., that the cestuy que use shall take the profits,
and that the ter-tenant shall make estates according to his direction. So
that, he who hath a use hath notajus neque in re neque ad rem, but only a
confidence and trust for which he hath no remedy by the common law,
but his remedy was only by subpoena in Chancery. If the feoffees would
not perform the order of the Chancery, then their persons, for the
breach of the confidence, were to be imprisoned, till they did perform
it, and therefore the case of a use is not like unto commons, rents, condi-
tions, etc., which are hereditaments in judgment of law, and which can-
not be taken away or discontinued by the alienation of the ter-tenants,
or by disseisins, or by escheats, etc., as uses may ....
1 Co. Rep. 121b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 273-275.
Coke adopted a similar definition of uses in his commentary on Littleton:
Nota, an use is a trust or confidence reposed in some other, which is
not issuing out of the land, but is a thing collateral, annexed in privitie
to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, scilicet,
that cestuy que use shall take the profit, and that the terre-tenant shall
make an estate according to his direction. So as cestuy que use had
neither jus in re norjud ad rem, but only a confidence or trust, for which
he had no remedie by the common law, but for breach of trust, his remedy
was only by subpoena in chancerie.
Co. Litt 272b quoted in Percy Bordwell, Equity and the Law of Property, 20 IOWA L. REV. 1,
11(1934).
2771 Co. Rep. 124a, 76 Eng. Rep. 282-285:
And if by any construction out of this Act, contingent uses should be
preserved: 1. Greater inconveniences would follow than were before.
2. Great absurdities would from thence likewise ensue.
For... land would pass against the rule of the common law from one
to another so easily, and upon such secret conditions and limitations,
that no person could no in whom the estate of the land did remain.
Cf. Bordwell, supra note 253, at 22-25 (reviewing the opinions of the judges in Chudleigh's
Case); COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACONsupra note 191, at 132 (further elaborating on Coke's
argument).
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agreeing that uses imitated in any way possession, he urged that they
stood upon their own reasons utterly differing from cases of possession
in respect to their raising, preservation, and extinguishment.
2 78
Coke and Bacon wrote at a time during which reliance upon the use had
become treacherous. Bacon himself stated that as the result of the Statute of
Uses "the inheritances of this realm are tossed at this day, as upon a sea, in such
sort that it is hard to say which bark will sink, and which will get to the haven:
that is to say, what assurances will stand good and what will not."279 Even those
uses not executed by the Statute were not always enforced by the Chancellor.
Thus, for instance, Simpson records that some Chancellors viewed uses for a
term of years-which as a use upon a non-freehold estate was not executed by
the Statute--"as fraudulent evasions of the Statute of Uses" and so declined
enforcement.280 But when, after 1660, the use was revitalized under the guise
of the trust, it was Bacon's more flexible conception that would prevail.
3. The New Chancery and the Expanded Doctrine of Trusts
With the enactment of the Statute of Tenures, "[t]he economic purpose of the
Statute of Uses had disappeared." 281 There was no longer any need to prevent
the evasion of the feudal incidents, since the feudal incidents had now
themselves been effectively abolished. Simultaneously, the Court of Chancery
reasserted itself. Austin Scott, Percy Bordwell and other leading scholars all
agree that the Court of Chancery now entered into its "modem" period.282
278 Bordwell, supra note 275, at 12-13.
Where Coke saw the use as conferring no rights on the cestui, Bacon defined it as
a form of "ownership":
So as now we are come.., to the affirmative, what an use is; agree-
able to the definition in Delamer's Case, where it is said: an use is a
trust reposed by any person in the terre-tenant, that he may suffer him
to take the profits, and that he will perform his intent. But it is a shorter
speech to say, that usus est dominiumfiduciarium: Use is an ownership
in trust.
VII FRANCIS BACON, READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES in BACON'S WORKS 400-401 Games
Spedding, ed. 1872). Cf. COQUILLE'ITI, FRANCIS BACON supra note 191, at 132-35 (further
elaborating on areas of disagreement between Coke and Bacon).
279 BACON, supra note 278, at 395.
280S1MPSON, supra note 40, at 187. Active uses were more regularly given effect by the
Chancellor. Id. at 201. On the use upon a use, see infra notes 284-93 and accompanying
text.
28 1SIMNpsON, supra note 40, at 187.
282 Austin Scott divides the history of Chancery into four periods. The fourth and final
period began in the middle decades of the seventeenth century when "[t]he old
philosophy of uses... gave way to a new philosophy of trusts based upon clearer
conceptions of public policy and of the nature and purposes of the law." I AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, 22(3d ed. 1967).
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Substantially responsible for this development was Lord Nottingham,
who-as noted-was also instrumental in resolving the Duke of Norfolk's
Case.283
Accompanying the revitalization of the Chancery was a revitalization of the
use. This revitalization occurred through the mechanism of the use upon a use.
This so-called "double use" had been given unfavorable treatment in 1557, in
Jane Tyrrel's Case.284 Milsom has explained the situation:
The bargain and sale enrolled had come to be regarded as the
equivalent of a feoffment, and it was easy to forget that it worked only
because the bargain and sale raised an implied use. If then a grant to
uses was intended, and the land was conveyed to the feoffee by this
method instead of by feoffment, a use upon a use necessarily resulted.
In Tyrrel's Case in 1557 a tenant in fee simple desired to settle land upon
herself for life, remainder to her son in tail, remainder to her own right
heirs. She bargained and sold to the son to those uses, presumably
intending that the Statute [of Uses] should execute them. But they were
held void as repugnant to the implied use.285
Despite this condemnation, John Baker has found evidence that the use upon
a use was enforced in a few "special cases" even in the sixteenth century.286 But,
Percy Bordwell divides the history of Chancery into three periods, but agrees with
Scott that the modem period commences with the mid-seventeenth century. Bordwell
states:
With the third period, Chancery came into its own. Back of this period
Chancery doctrine is dim and uncertain. The third or modem period is
one of great systematic development. The Chancellor... was the inher-
itor of a great tradition and he made the most of it, but he had much
more in common with the common law judges.., and his court took on
the habits of courts of law to a much greater extent than when it was
thought of as a court of conscience.
Bordwell, supra note 253, at 4.
2 83 See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
2842 Dyer 155a. Cf. GEORGE W. KEETON & L.A. SHERIDAN, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 26 (10th
ed. 1974) (analyzing Jane Tyrrel's Case).
285MILSOM, supra note 2, at 208. It is important to stress the distinction between the
bargain and sale and enfeoffment. It was held beginning in the early sixteenth century
that a completed bargain and sale agreement would result in the creation of a use to the
benefit of the purchaser as soon as the purchase price was paid but before the buyer has
been able to take possession. "The underlying notion here is that it would be
unconscionable of [the seller] to hold to his use after he had been paid the money." See
SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 178.
2 86See BAKER, AN INTRODUCTIONTO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 271, at 329. Cf.
John H. Baker, The Use Upon a Use in Equity, 1558-1625, 93 LAW Q. REV. 33 (1978)(analyzing some of these exceptional cases).
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Baker continues, what had been a "trickle" in the sixteenth century, grew into
"a common form" in the seventeenth. 287
It is the emergence of this "common form" that is our concern. The case of
Sambach v. Dalston (1634) is frequently understood as the first step in the effort
to revitalize the use upon a use,288 but as Simpson has demonstrated this case
did not introduce any new theoretical innovations. Rather, Chancery simply
intervened in order to remedy a poorly drafted conveyance by requiring "that
the legal estate be conveyed to the second cestui que use."289
Indeed, as Simpson has shown, it was not until after the enactment of the
Statute of Tenures, in the case of Ash v. Gallen (1668),290 that Chancery showed
itself ready to put the use upon a use on a solid theoretical footing:
In Ash v. Gallen there was another blunder. The parties to a
conveyance had intended to convey by feoffment to uses, but the
conveyance had been mismanaged and there had been a bargain and
sale to uses; thus inadvertently but incompetently they had limited a
use upon a use. It was suggested that the second use could be enforced
as a trust, and in the context this seems to envisage the first cestui que
use holding in trust for the second, rather than actually conveying the
land.291
It was then left to Lord Nottingham to work the use upon a use into a form
that lawyers might productively employ. Distinguishing between a use and a
trust, Nottingham declared "that 'if a use be limited upon a use, though the
second use be not good in law nor executed by the statute, yet it amounts to a
declaration of trust and may be executed in Chancery." 292 By the early
2875ee BAKER, supra note 271, at 329.
288 0n Sambach v. Dalston, see J.E. Strathdene, Sambach v. Dalston: An Unnoticed
Report, 74 LAW Q. REV. 550 (1958) (the most thorough review of this case); cf. MILSOM
supra note 2, at 208-09 (an example of a scholar who places relatively too much weight
on Sambach).
28 9See SIMPSON supra note 40, at 202. Simpson continues:
This amounts to saying that since the Statute of Uses fails to execute
the second use, yet, since it was unconscionable not to execute it,
equity would insist upon its execution by private conveyance. The
decision in Sambach v. Dalston did not therefore open any doors to
deliberate evasion of the statute's design to end the separation of
legal and equitable ownership.
Id. at 202.
2901 Ch. Cases 114,22 Eng. Rep. 720 (cited and analyzed in SIMPSON, supra note 40, at
190-91). Indeed, counsel for plaintiff argued that "tho' a Use could not rise as a Use upon
a Use, yet as a Trust it would in Equity." 1 Ch. Cas. at 114,22 Eng. Rep. at 720.
291SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 203.
292 D.E.C. Yale, The Revival of Equitable Estates in the Seventeenth Century: An
Explanation by Lord Nottingham, 1957 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 72, 84 (1957). On the
emergence of a sophisticated notion of trusts, see infra notes 294-311 and accompanying
text.
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eighteenth century, this conception of the use upon a use as a trust enforceable
by Chancery had become a commonplace means of avoiding the operation of
the Statute of Uses and structuring dispositions of property.293
Furthermore, as Lord Nottingham's distinction between trusts and uses
suggests, a whole new range of meanings was imputed to the word "trust"
beginning in the 1670s and 1680s. Analysis of this word centered around the
nature of the property interest the beneficiary had in the trust and would lead
ultimately to the creation of a refined system of equitable estates that conferred
on the beneficiary substantial rights which the Chancellor stood ready to
protect.
As noted above, Coke in his report of Chudleigh's Case denied that a use or
trust conveyed rights at law to the beneficiary and so concluded that a
disappointed beneficiary's only remedy was to seek a subpoena in Chancery.294
Bacon, on the other hand, was willing to define the interest a beneficiary
enjoyed as a form of "ownership."29 5 It was, however, Coke's limited
conception that dominated the legal analysis of the first half of the seventeenth
century. To the extent that rights were recognized at all, they were personal
rights; the cestui que use might possess a chose in action, that is, he might enjoy
a personal right to seek relief in Chancery, but otherwise the cestui "could expect
only very limited protection."296
Matters changed dramatically beginning in the mid-seventeenth century.
Rex v. Holland (1648) "was a genuine precursor to the forthcoming shift.... "297
Holland involved the status of land "put in trust for the use of an alien, and the
question was whether this violated the rule forbidding aliens to 'purchase'
English lands."2 98 Counsel for the cestui-whose chief interest was in seeing to
the validity of the transaction-maintained that a trust did not create an estate
but conferred on the beneficiary only a cause of action. Thus the prohibition on
293 See SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 204-06.
294 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
2 9 6 VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY: A HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAw (1992) at 123. Palmer continues:
[The cestui's] remedy was confined to the person trusted, that person's
heir, or sometimes his alienee if he took with notice of the use. Hence,
the trust asset was still subject to the claims of the trustee's creditors,
to the rights of dower and curtesy, and liable to escheat to the Crown
for the felony or attainder of the trustee. It was not until the trust
estate was seen as the direct property interest of the cestui that such
intervening claims were defeated.
Id.
2971d. at 123. Cf. Rex v. Holland, Style 20,82 Eng. Rep. 498.
298 pALMER, supra note 296, at 123.
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foreign ownership of land was not violated.299 King's counsel, however,
argued that a trust "was not a thing meerly in action, but an hereditament," that
is, a real interest in land.300 Chief Justice Rolle, for his part, cautiously opened
the door to an expanded notion of the trust by concluding that the nature of a
trust "was not fixed, but was dependent upon that of the asset placed in
trust.1301
The decision in Rex v. Holland, D.E.C. Yale records, "is the opening of the way
for Lord Nottingham's work."302 In a number of important cases over the
course of his tenure as Chancellor, Nottingham constructed the modem notion
of the trust as an equitable estate out of the old case law and statutory law
governing uses. On the one hand, Nottingham moved to secure the rights of
the cestui against violation by the trustee or by those who had claims against
the trustee.303 Thus, for instance, in the case of Bevant v. Pope Nottingham
determined that the dower rights of the trustee's wife could not be met with
assets drawn from the trust.3°4 Similarly, in the case of Medley v. Martin
Nottingham ruled that the trustee's creditors could not satisfy their claims
against the trustee from the trust since to do so would violate the rights of the
cestui.305
On the other hand, Nottingham acted to treat the assets of the trust as the
cestui's own assets where the cestui had exposed himself to liability.306 Thus in
Grey v. Colville Nottingham permitted a creditor who had obtained a judgment
against the cestui to satisfy that judgment by recourse to the assets of the
trust.307 And in Tooke's Case Nottingham held that "where the trust consisted of
a lease that the cestui had mortgaged, then the lease should be sold to pay off
the cestui's indebtedness."308
2991d. Cf. Rex v. Holland, 82 Eng. Rep. at 498 ("it was a trust for an alien to take the
profits of the land, and in that the alien had no estate in the land; ... this trust was a
thing only in action .... ")
30082 Eng. Rep. at 499. Cf. PALMER, supra note 296, at 123 (analyzing the argument of
King's counsel).
30 1PALMER, supra note 296, at 123. Cf. Rex v. Holland, 82 Eng. Rep. at 499 ("a trust is
not a thing in action, but may be an inheritance or a chatell as the case falls out.")
30211 D.E.C. Yale, Introduction, LORD NOTINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES 90 (1961).
30 3This point is developed by Yale, Introduction, supra note 303, at 91.
304 See Bevant v. Pope, 2 Freeman 71, 22 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1681). Cf PALMER supra note
296, at 125 (analyzing Bevant v. Pope).
305 See Medley v. Martin, Rep. temp. Finch 63,23 Eng. Rep. 33 (1673). Cf. PALMER supra
note 296, at 125 (analyzing Medley v. Martin).
306 See Yale, "Introduction," supra note 302, at 91.
307See Grey v. Colville, 2 Ch. Rep. 143,21 Eng. Rep. 641 (1679). Cf Yale, 'Introduction,"
supra note 302, at 98 (analyzing Grey v. Colville).
308 See PALMER, supra note 296, at 125. Cf. Baden v. Earl of Pembroke (1688) 2 Vein. 52,
54,23 Eng. Rep. 644,645 (quoting Tooke's Case).
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These decisions by Lord Nottingham, it has been said, had a "revolutionary
effect" on the development of trusts.309 Henceforth "the cestui was recognized
as an owner .... "310 The concept of an equitable estate had essentially been
created. The rule in Chudleigh's Case was eventually "whittl[ed] down" and it
became possible as well to create contingent future uses enforceable by
Chancery.31 The eighteenth century judiciary would propound elaborate rules
governing the operation of equitable estates but it is unnecessary, for the
purposes of this Article, to pursue these developments further. It suffices to
have shown that the way was now opened for the judicial recognition of
complex transactions. The use, the abuse of which at least the Statute of Uses
aimed to "extirpate," had now-with the abolition of the feudal
tenures-provided the foundation for the growth of a whole new area of law.
Again, one sees the land law being revolutionized.
B. The Equitable Mortgage
1. Common-Law Antecedents
Etymologically, the word "mortgage" probably has its roots in the notion of
the "gage," "which appears in England as early as the Domesday Book."312
While the gage in its earliest incarnation predates the appearance of credit
transactions, 313 by the time one arrives at the age of Glanvill (c. 1187) it has
come to play a role in certain sorts of primitive financial arrangements. 314 By
309See e.g., PALMER, supra note 296, at 125, note 196.
310Id. at 125.
3 11 0n the "whittling down" of the rule in Chudleigh's Case, see SIMPSON supra note 40,
at 218-19; on the complex story of the development of the relationship of trusts and
future interests, see id. at 218-31. On the role played Purefoy v. Rogers played in this
whittling down, see infra note 234 and accompanying text.
312PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 603.
3131d. at 603.
3141d. at 604. Ann Burkhart tells us:
Our information about the gage comes from Glanville, who described
two primary types of gage in use at this time, the vifgage or vivum
vadium ('living pledge') and the mortgage or mortuum vadium ('dead
pledge'). According to Glanville, under both types of gage the gagor
authorized the gagee to take possession of the encumbered land and
to collect the rents and profits from it.
Depending on the type of gage given, however, the financial
consequences were vastly different. Pursuant to a vifgage, the gagee
was required to apply the rents and profits to reduce the outstanding
debt. Glanville described this form of security as 'just and binding.'
Glanville denounced the mort gage, on the other hand, as 'unjust and
dishonest' because the gagee was not required to apply the rents and
profits to reduce the debt. The pledge was 'dead' because the pledged
property was not generating any benefit for the gagor.
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the time one reaches Bracton's age, however, in the middle decades of the
thirteenth century, a more structured form of gage had come into being: "the
popular form of gage [had become] a lease for years to the creditor, under the
condition that, if the debt be not paid at the end of the term, the creditor shall
hold the land in fee."3 15
As the feudal land law took on a finished form in the fifteenth century,
conceptual problems became apparent with the Bractonian form of the
mortgage, especially in the relief granted to the mortgagee upon default:
Courts could not logically justify the transformation of a term for
years, which was characterized as a chattel real, into a fee estate
without a further conveyance from the borrower. The primary
difficulty with this result was that a term for years was not created by
the formal requisite of livery of seisin, which was a necessary element
of a fee estate. Therefore, courts concluded that the lender's interest
upon the borrower's default was only that of a termor rather than that
of a fee owner.
3 16
Thomas Littleton stepped forward to remedy this problem. In his treatise on
Tenures he proposed that:
[Tihe borrower conveyed not merely possession when the loan was
made, but rather the fee title by formal livery of seisin. This fee estate
was created subject to the borrower's right to re-enter if he paid the
loan according to the terms of the gage. If the borrower failed to
perform in full on the specified day, which, ironically, was termed 'law
day,' the lender's fee estate became absolute regardless of the value of
the property in relation to the amount of outstanding debt. Moreover
the borrower had no judicially recognized right of redemption .... 30
But the development of this solution to the problem of the sort of estate the
mortgagor conveyed posed problems of its own. Indeed, its logic required the
courts of common law to adopt a strict formalism when confronted with a
borrower who had defaulted. Since the borrower had conveyed a fee simple
Ann L. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REv. 283, 305-06 (1987). Cf
Harold Dexter Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Mediaeval England, in I SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 646, 647-56 (1909) (providing further detail
concerning the emergence of the "gage").
Plucknett suggests that the mortgage, or "dead pledge" received this name because
those who made this sort of pledge thereby committed usury, a deadly sin. PLUCKNET-r,
supra note 2, at 604.
315Hazeltine, supra note 314, at 655. Hazeltine continues: "During the term the gagee
has thepossessio orseisina of a termor, and this possession is protected bywrit. On default
of the debtor the fee shifts at once and without process of law to the creditor; the fee, the
land itself, is thus forfeited for the debt." Id. Cf. Burkhart, supra note 314, at 310-11
(providing further information on the operation of the Bractonian mortgage).
31 6Burkhart, supra note 314, at 311.
3 171d. at 312 (summarizing Littleton's Tenures).
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estate to the lender subject to payment in full on "law day," the court had no
choice but to give legal recognition to this arrangement. Courts of common law
might have dealt with the borrower in these circumstances "strictly and
unsympathetically,"318 but conceptually they had little choice in the matter.319
Chancery commenced to rectify this situation beginning in the later decades
of the fifteenth century.320 The Chancellor proceeded slowly and tentatively at
first, resolving each case on issues peculiar to it. While the jurisdictional basis
for the Chancery's actions at this early period is unknown, it has been
hypothesized that relief was granted in these early cases where it was obvious
that the mortgagee had unfairly taken advantage of the mortgagor.321
By the time one arrived at the age of Elizabeth I, however, relief in Chancery
had become a regular occurrence. It was at this time that the Chancellor began
to grant relief in situations where the mortgagor "had failed to pay on the stated
day.. . . "322 But while the Chancellor was proving himself willing to relieve
the mortgagor from a rigid application of the requirement that the entire
mortgage be satisfied on the "law day" under penalty of loss of the estate, he
nevertheless required the mortgagor to demonstrate that the failure to satisfy
the obligation was the result of some peculiar hardship.323
In 1625, however, in the case of Emmanuel College v. Evans, the Chancellor
dropped the requirement that the mortgagor plead hardship.324 Indeed, in the
Emmanuel College case:
318SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 243.
319See R.W. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: ITS NATURE, HISTORY AND
CONNECTION WITH EQUITABLE ESTATES GENERALLY (1931, reprinted, 1986):
The intention which the Court of Common Law followed was the
literal intention of the condition, which was forfeiture of land in
the case of non-payment on the day named. Such was the situation
at common law, and it is difficult to conceive on what ground the
Courts of Common Law could have given relief, even had they been
so inclined. The mortgagee, by default of the mortgagor, had become
the absolute owner in pursuance of the condition. The mortgagor
then had no remedy. The land was lost to him now and forever.
Id. at 21. Cf. SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 243-244 (providing additional detail concerning
the role the courts of common law played in the enforcement of mortgage agreements).
3 20See SIMPSON, supra note 40, at 244.
321 See TURNER, supra note 319, at 21-4. The typical situation presented to the Chancellor
in this early period, according Turner, involved: "[plroperty... delivered or conveyed
as a security [where] the debt was duly paid on the day, or if no day was fixed, when it
had been satisfied out of the rents and profits .... Id. at 21. In these circumstances, the
Chancellor would order the mortgagee, who was by the terms of the mortgage in
possession of a fee simple interest, to reconvey the property to the mortgagor. Id.
3 22 1d. at 24.
3 23 Id. at 25-26. It seems that Chancery first began to grant relief from the rigid
application of penal bonds, and then extended this practice to mortgages. Id.
3 24See Emmanuel College v. Evans, 1 Ch. Rep. 18,21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625). Cf. TURNER,
supra note 319, at 27-8 (elaborating on the holding in Emmanuel College); SIMPSON, supra
1995)
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[W]e find that . . . relief has been extended to forfeitures of
mortgages in general, irrespective of fraud or other special
circumstances as the ground of relief. What is more, the relief has soon
not only become general in the sense that it can be given apart from
special circumstances, but it has come to be looked on as a definite rule
of the Court that such relief shall always be given.
325
It is unclear why the Emmanuel College Court ruled as broadly as it did. The
reporter who recorded the Emmanuel College opinion declared that the decision
was based on the conception of the mortgage as "being but a security."326
Turner, however, asserts that this is the only pre-Restoration case that expressly
conceives of mortgages as security interests.327 Perhaps, Turner concludes,
since the report of Emmanuel College was only written down in the 1680s, the
reporter was anachronistically superimposing a later conception onto an
earlier period of time.328 But whatever the reason, it became clear beginning in
the 1620s that the Chancellor was now ready regularly to grant mortgagors
relief from oppressive circumstances.
2. The Development of the Equitable Mortgage
The circumstances that prevailed in 1660, at the time of the Restoration of
Charles II, were as follows: Chancery had, since the 1620s, recognized that a
mortgagor had a power or right to seek the redemption of a forfeited mortgage
under certain conditions. There was no longer any need for the mortgagor to
demonstrate hardship, but at the same time some foundational issues remained
unanswered. What was the basis upon which the Chancellor granted relief?
What were the limits of the relief that might be obtained? 329
note 40, at 244 (analyzing Emmanuel College).
325TURNER, supra note 319, at 27. Turner continues:
Very soon the mortgagor considers that he has a right to redeem
in Chancery, although the day is passed for such redemption at
law. He no longer asks for relief as of special favour, but asks
that the usual clemency be shown him. Two limitations only are
imposed by the Chancellors on this new custom of granting general
relief to all mortgagors upon condition forfeited. First, the mortgagor
must come and tender the principal, interest, and costs within a
reasonable time after the forfeiture; and secondly, should the mortga-
gee require his money, he can go to the Court and obtain a decree
ordering the debtor to pay by a fixed date or be foreclosed forever of
his power of redemption.
Id.
3261 Ch. Rep. at 20, 21 En. Rep. at 495. On the significance of the conception of
mortgages as security interest.
327 See TURNER, supra note 319, at 38.
3281d. at 37.
329 Turner has described the situation:
By the time of accession of Charles II the mortgagor had acquired a
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An important step toward clarifying these questions was taken in the case
of Pawlett v. Attorney General.330 Pawlett did not involve a mortgage, but rather
posed the question whether a trust estate might be escheated to the Crown as
a penalty for felony. It was argued on analogy to the mortgagor's equity of
redemption that a trust was not subject to such an escheat.331 Matthew Hale,
however, acting in his judicial capacity, rejected the claimed analogy and
instead proposed that a mortgage was something more than a trust.
I conceive that a mortgage is not merely a trust; but a title in equity....
There is a diversity betwixt a trust and a power of redemption; for a
trust is created by the contract of the party, and he may direct it as he
pleaseth; and he may provide for the execution of it .... But a power
of equity is an equitable right inherent in the land .... Because it is an
ancient right, which the party is entitled to in equity .... [t]he law takes
notice of it and makes it assignable and deviseable.
332
Hale's assertion that the power of redemption amounted to a title in equity
and was assignable and deviseable marked a significant advance in
understanding the theoretical foundation of the Chancellor's jurisdiction over
mortgages. But Hale's opinion was flawed in some crucial respects. For one
thing, it articulates a backward-looking notion of the trust, which was to fall
into disrepute during Lord Nottingham's tenure.333 For another thing,
Hale-who was the most sophisticated historian of his day-simply engages
in bad history. The power of equitable redemption was not an ancient right,
but for the most part a novel development of the previous half-century still in
need of explanation. What is important for our purposes is that Hale provided
this explanation: The power of redemption was now understood as a "title in
equity."
Subsequent case law, especially the decisions of Lord Nottingham, explore
the parameters of this new equitable estate. Perhaps the most important of
customary right to be relieved of a forfeited mortgage on payment
of principal, interest, and costs, provided he was not dilatory in seek-
ing that relief. Yet, although he was beginning to regard the relief to
be sought in Chancery as a right, by reason of the great number of
previous cases in which it had been granted, he could never be certain
that the Chancellor would not make exceptions to the general rule, or
that a new Chancellor might not be less friendly disposed towards
relieving forfeited mortgages and bonds.
Id. at 51-52.
330Hard. 465, 145 Eng. Rep. 550 (1667).
33 1Hard. at 466, 145 Eng. Rep. at 550.
3 32Attomey General v. Pawlett, Hard. at 466, 469, 145 Eng. Rep. at 551-52. Turner
indicates that Hale's description of the equity of redemption as "an ancient right" is
"rather obscure." See TURNER, supra note 319, at 52.
3 33 0n Hale's conservatism with respect to trusts and uses, see TURNER, supra note 319,
at 52-53.
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these cases is Thornbrough v. Baker (1676),334 which involved the question
"whether, on the mortgagor's redeeming in equity after the decease of the
mortgagee, the heirs of the latter or his personal representatives were entitled
to the money."335 The question was an important one because it raised the old
issue of the type of right the mortgagee enjoyed: was it a real interest in the
land, extinguishable upon the mortgagor's satisfaction of the debt? Or was it
merely a personal right to the payment of the debt? Nottingham favored the
latter alternative, reasoning that:
[I]n natural Justice and Equity, the principal Right of the Mortgagee
is to the Money, and his Right to the Land is only as Security for the
Money; wherefore, when the Security descends to the Heir of the
Mortgagee attended with an Equity of Redemption, as soon as the
Mortgagor pays the Money, the Lands belong to him, and only the
Money to the Mortgagee, which is merely personal, and so accrues to
to the Executors or Administrators of the Mortgagee.
336
Thus, not only did the mortgagor enjoy an equitable estate that the Chancery
would protect, the mortgagee's right was now defined as a personal one
limited-in ordinary circumstances-to a claim for the money. Subsequent
cases would develop rules governing the relationship between mortgagor and
mortgagee, but this case law would take shape along the premises Nottingham
had laid down.337 Lord Hardwicke, in the eighteenth century, proposed that
the mortgagor might, for equitable purposes, be seised of the estate, but in
advancing this proposition he was only building upon the foundation laid
down by Hale and Nottingham.338
These new developments were both the product of the gentry's needs and
facilitated the growth of a market in land. Status, investment, and speculation
remained the reasons behind a brisk market in land for the late seventeenth
and much of the eighteenth centuries.339 But rather than examine the
functioning of this market in the abstract, one might do well to consider a single
3341 Ch. Cas. 284,22 Eng. Rep. 802.
3 35TuRNER, supra note 319, at 58.
3 36Thombrough v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cases 283, at 284, 22 Eng. Rep. 803 (1676) (spelling
modernized). For background to Thornbrough, see TURNER, supra note 319, at 61-62.
3 37See TURNER, supra note 319, at 62-63 (analyzing subsequent seventeenth-century
case law on the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee). See also Frank S. Alexander,
Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 288 299-302 (1987)
(analyzing the development of rules governing the prepayment of mortgages in the late
seventeenth century).
3 38For Lord Hardwicke's contribution to the development of the mortgage, see
TURNER, supra note 319, at 65-87.
3 39See HABAKKUK, supra note 239, at 403-12 (exploring these varied motives for the
purchase of land).
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historical figure as representative of the sort of person who was instrumental
in bringing about these new conditions and in benefitting from them.
One might consider Sir John Banks. The son of a father who was a successful
woollen draper in London and a mother drawn from the lesser gentry, Banks
made a fortune in business, first helping to outfit the Cromwellian navy during
the 1650s, and later serving as one of the directors of the East India Company.340
Banks was strategically situated to promote trade with both India and Africa,
and he was also a pioneer in the development of public finance, drawing upon
the assets of the East India Company to finance various royal ventures, but
always with a quid pro quo exacted. 341 He kept a close alliance with the family
of Lord Nottingham throughout his public career,342 and Banks's daughter
eventually married into that family.343 He served in Parliament for a total of
twenty-six years from the 1660s to the 1690s, where "[b]usiness interests and
the profitability of government finance combined with a cool, secular, rational
opportunism to produce a government Tory who had decided where to go to
see that his bread was buttered .... ,1344
Throughout his active years, Banks not only busied himself with business
ventures and political maneuvering, but also steadily built an estate for himself
and his family. He acquired his first landed estate through a marriage
settlement with his bride, who came from a more established family, and
thereafter continually added to his holdings throughout his business life.345
While these acquisitions were intended to provide Banks with social status,
they were also to be improved, to use the vocabulary of the time. And Banks
was a fastidious keeper of his estates, seeking to draw appropriate profits from
them. 346
The new land law was the product of men who for the most part shared the
background and the value system of Sir John Banks. The compromises
embodied in the new land law-the balance struck between free alienability
and the need to preserve the intergenerational integrity of the large estates, the
development of trusts, and the new and sophisticated conception of
mortgages--no doubt met with their general approbation. It had, after all, now
become their land law.
3 40See generally D.C. COLEMAN, SIR JOHN BANKS BARONET AND BusINEssMAN, A STUDY
OF BUSINESs, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY IN LATER STUART ENGLAND (1963).
3 411d. at 70-78.
34 2 d. at 108-09.
3431d. at 190-91.
3 4 4 COLEMAN, supra note 340, at 170-71.
345Id. at 42-52, 119-47, and 172-84.
3461d. at 172-84.
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CONCLUSION
At the outset of this Article, two theses were put forward for examination:
That the English land law was transformed in the years roughly 1625-1700 and
that the English Revolution was the engine responsible for this transformation.
The transformation that the land law underwent should be obvious. The
enforcement apparatus-preeminently the Court of Wards and
Liveries-erected by Henry VIII as part of his resurrection of the feudal tenures
was abolished in the 1640s by the parliamentary party that had seized power
from Charles I. This abolition was subsequently confirmed by the Statute of
Tenures, which was enacted by the Restoration Parliament in 1660.
The Statute of Tenures represented the triumph of the new order not only in
its abolition of the Court of Wards but in other ways as well. Henceforward,
according to the terms of the Statute, the Crown was prohibited from creating
new forms of feudal tenure and thereby prevented from imposing new forms
of irrational fees and obligations upon the landed classes. New estates could
only be held in free and common socage tenure. In this way, the land law was
being placed upon a new conceptual foundation.
The logic of the Statute of Tenures extended as well to such ancient forms of
landholding as copyhold. As demonstrated above, in the course of the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, the Courts, especially the Chancery, had
conferred upon copyhold a substantial amount of judicial protection. But
copyhold was part of an old system of feudal estates which was destined to
atrophy in the years after 1660. Its fate was to become a 'mischievous
anachronism" whose later history consisted mainly of "expedients for its
extinguishment" and which was finally entirely abolished in the early
twentieth century.
Similarly, public sentiment about enclosure underwent a dramatic
transformation in the years around 1660. Sixteenth-century elites had been
emphatic in their opposition to enclosure. It was denounced as a destructive
and exploitive practice by such stalwarts as Thomas More and Hugh Latimer.
This opposition was codified into a whole series of anti-enclosure laws, which
were at least occasionally rigorously enforced.
But by the early seventeenth century, a noticeable shift in public opinion was
well underway. The purposes served by enclosure were in the midst of a
transformation in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. In the
sixteenth century, enclosure was practised in order to aggregate together large
tracts of land to accommodate sheep grazing. But in the seventeenth century,
enclosure was coming to be practised in order to take advantage of the new
agricultural techniques then being developed. Because larger numbers of
people were benefited, the rhetoric of "improvement" which was invoked to
justify enclosures met a warm reception from the 1620s onward. Indeed, in the
decades after 1660 it became increasingly difficult even to make the
anti-enclosure argument.
All of these developments might be said to have favored those who benefited
from economic development-the entrepreneurs, those farmers who utilized
the latest scientific techniques, and other such groups. But to see these
developments as representing a new form of "possessive individualism" loses
sight of the strong role that the family-especially the elite family concerned
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with intergenerational survival-played in shaping other parts of the land law.
The cause of economic development must be seen as a frequent opponent of
dynastic stability.
These two rival interests-the need to allow for economic development and
the requirement that family estates be preserved and handed down to the next
generation-were the subject of an enduring compromise worked out by the
common lawyers in the years after 1660. The main lines of this compromise are
sketched above. The Rule Against Perpetuities, the Strict Settlement, and the
modem trust were all aspects of this compromise. Free alienability of land
would be allowed, but in appropriate circumstances this principle might also
be strictly subordinated to family interests. The plight of the poet Shelley, as
documented above, illustrates how truly little the free alienability of land
meant in a contest with a father who insisted that the family's strict settlement
be observed.
Particular features of this compromise-most notably the notion of an
equitable estate which became the basis of the modem mortgage-would have
the effect of promoting the idea of land as a commodity, to be bought and sold
for profit. But this sort of commerce was to occur in the larger context of the
requirement that family dynastic interests were to be protected.
Historians have explored particular components of this transformation in
the land law. What has been missing in the literature, however-and what it is
hoped that this Article has provided-is an overview of the full dimensions of
the transformation that was worked. The English land law was not merely
reformed in small, incremental steps. Rather, major portions of it were
fundamentally reconceived. Old institutions were abolished or marginalized,
while new institutions were invented. The title of this Article, "The
Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law," seems fully
justified.
But was this transformation a product of the English Revolution? The
evidence justifies an affirmative answer to this question as well. First, it must
be stressed that particular features of the transformation were the direct
product of the parliamentary party's victory. This is the case, for instance, with
the abolition of the Court of Wards and Liveries. The abolition of this Court
was one of the priorities for the triumphant parliamentarians in the 1640s.
The same can also be said for the Statute of Tenures. The Restoration
Parliament which enacted this piece of legislation had no desire to return to the
days when the Crown could exploit knight service and the other feudal tenures
as a means of extracting wealth from the landed classes. The relationship of the
Crown to these tenures was fundamentally altered. The king could no longer
create feudal tenures and was deprived of the means of enforcing the old feudal
dues. The Statute of Tenures might thus be seen as part of the larger program
of limiting royal prerogative and power that was carried out by Parliament
beginning in 1660.
The Statute of Tenures subsequently bore profound consequences for much
else in the English land law. Since the feudal tenures were no longer an
important source of Crown revenue, the Statute of Uses had lost its central
purpose-there was no longer any need to restrict recourse to uses as a means
of preventing a loss of income to the Crown. The door was thus opened to
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renewed experimentation with the concept of the use. This was the door
through which such important figures as Lord Nottingham quickly moved.
This evidence, taken alone, justifies a conclusion in favor of a relationship
between the English Revolution and the transformation of the English land law.
But more broadly speaking, one can see in the land law the carrying out of a
program that had gradually taken shape from at least the 1620s onward. Royal
power was to be placed within strict limits and made subject to substantial
supervision by the Parliament. The economic interests of the landed classes
were to be promoted, but long-term dynastic concerns were also to be
protected. English society had acquired a character that it would not lose until
after the Great War of 1914-1918.
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